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INTRODUCTION
Hedge funds are important actors in the global economy. In
2009, they managed $1.7 trillion, a 139'- increase compared to 2008 but
still a decrease from $2.1 trillion in 2007.1 It is estimated that 9400
hedge funds are operating worldwide, a reduction of more than 1000
funds from the 2007 peak,' due to the financial crisis, during which
three quarters of hedge funds suffered an average 15.7% loss.3
Even though the industry has faced some difficulties over the
past two years, hedge funds have played an important role in the
global financial system. They have assured efficiency in capital mar-
kets, provided a significant source of liquidity, and absorbed financial
1 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SEnvici's LONDON (IFSL) RESEARIi, HEDGE FUNIDs
2010 1 (2010), http://www.thecityuk.com/media/2358/HedgeFunds 2010.pdf
[hereinafter IFSL RESEARCH 2010].
2 Id. at 2.
2 See id.
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risks.' The benefits these investment vehicles bring to the markets
are essentially made possible by flexible and light regulatory regimes.
Unlike registered investment companies, they escape most of the dis-
closure, reporting, and leverage requirements.5
Though hedge funds did not cause the current crisis, there
seems to be a consensus among regulators that hedge funds need
stricter oversight.6 The rationale behind this desire to take action is
twofold. The first concern is systemic risk, which we define as the risk
of chain reactions of failures.' The current crisis has shown that mar-
kets are deeply interconnected and rely on one another. The size and
complexity of hedge funds may make some of them systemically signif-
icant and likely to provoke chain reactions that could lead to a genera-
lized collapse of financial markets.'
In light of the failures of Long Term Capital Management in
1998 and Amaranth Advisors in 2006,' we must ask whether hedge
funds pose a systemic risk and evaluate the potential remedies. Car-
rying out such assessments can be challenging for regulators who lack
the necessary tools to evaluate risks. Some entities may escape their
oversight, which, in turn, provides justification for more regulation.
The second concern that, according to regulators, justifies hedge fund
regulation is the need to achieve greater transparency and cure infor-
mational asymmetries in order to guarantee an appropriate level of
investor protection. 10
Part I of this paper examines the relevance of the systemic risk
and investor protection arguments. It provides a comparative over-
view of legal regimes applicable to hedge funds in five jurisdictions. It
focuses primarily on the United States and explores four European
Union (EU) member states' hedge fund regulations. The United King-
4 See SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE COMMISSION 4 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF
REPORT].
5 Testimony Concerning Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 4-5
(2003) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/041003tswhd.htm [hereinafter Donaldson
Testimony].
6 IFSL RESEARCH 2010, supra note 1, at 7.
7 See Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators' Ability to React to Threats in the Fi-
nancial System: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Financial Services, 112th
Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law and Business,
Duke Univ.) [hereinafter Schwarcz Testimony].
8 See id. at 3.
9 Donaldson Testimony, supra note 5, at 2.
10 Id.
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dom, France, Germany, and Italy have been chosen, for these countries
represent the variety of legal frameworks that coexist within the EU.
It concludes that although systemic risk may be a legitimate concern,
the investor protection argument is questionable.
Part II explores what the future of hedge fund regulation could
look like based on the different proposals sketched out prior to March
2010.11 The EU1 2 introduced the controversial Directive on Alterna-
tive Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) in April 2009 and the U.S.
House of Representatives enacted the Private Fund Investment Advis-
ers Registration Act of 2009 (PFIARA).' 3 Part II also discusses these
proposals and identifies a lack of global coordination in attempts to
reform hedge funds.
Part III develops the idea that hedge funds do not simply need
more regulation, but better regulation. The paper proposes a frame-
work to assess whether more regulation is the answer and, if so, sug-
gests what elements legislators should consider in the cost/benefit
analysis that should precede any attempt to introduce regulation.
Finally, the paper develops the idea that national particular-
isms must be transcended in order to establish an effective legal
framework on a global scale. I suggest the creation of a global
database for regulators' use. This database would bring together fi-
nancial information concerning all systemically sensitive financial en-
tities, including hedge funds. This system would favor ex-ante
monitoring, which would help reduce the likelihood of a systemic
crisis.
Definition
There is no formal, legal, or universally accepted definition of
the term "hedge fund."1 4 The term generally refers to a broad category
of pooled investment vehicles that are privately organized, adminis-
tered by professional investment managers, and not widely available
11 This paper was written in the middle of the legislative discussions in the E.U.
and in the United States in March 2010. Therefore the data are subject to change.
12 Although the European Union (EU) will be studied as a whole, the paper shall
mention the disagreements that may exist within the member states.
13 See H.R 4173, 111th Congress Title V, Subtitle A, December 11, 2009. The bill
was introduced in the Senate on January 20, 2010. It is currently in the hands of
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee and included in the
so-called "Dodd bill." Since the House version and the Dodd version of the
PFIARA are almost identical this paper refers to both versions under the term
"PFIARA" and highlights differences between the two versions when necessary.
[hereinafter PFIARA].
14 See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., HEDIGE FUNDS AND THE FSA 8 (2002), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dpl6.pdf at 8.
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to the public, but rather to wealthy and sophisticated individuals or
institutional investors."
Hedge funds can be defined by their characteristics as private
investment partnerships or investment corporations that use a wide
variety of trading strategies in order to seek absolute returns, such as
position-taking in a range of different markets.'" They employ a vari-
ety of trading techniques and instruments, including short-selling, de-
rivatives and leverage.' 7 Strategies and instruments vary a great deal
from one hedge fund to the other.'" William Donaldson underlines
that "[t]hese pools of capital may or may not utilize the sophisticated
hedging and arbitrage strategies that traditional hedge funds employ,
and many appear to engage in relatively simple equity strategies."' 9
Another way to distinguish hedge funds from other investment vehi-
cles is their particular compensation system, generally consisting of a
1-2% management fee and a 20% performance fee in average, which is
quite unique.2 0
From a legal perspective, hedge funds in the United States are
investment vehicles that are not regulated as investment companies
and that rely on various federal securities laws exemptions. 2 1 This
relative lack of regulation is also apparent in the EU, although ap-
proaches on how to deal with hedge funds vary between the United
States and the EU and even among EU member states themselves.2 2
The term "hedge fund" appears to be a "catch-all classifica-
tion"23 and therefore a preliminary remark is necessary. It seems that
regulating such a large range of investment vehicles, with different
strategies, structures, and sizes, in a uniform manner, may be ques-
tionable. Indeed, it carries the risk of inappropriate, vague, or
counterproductive regulation depending on the characteristics of each
hedge fund. The heterogeneity that exists within the hedge fund in-




18 ASSET MANAGERS' COMM. TO THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS.,
BEST PRACTICES FOR THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY iv (2008), available at http://www.
amaicmte.org/Public/AMC%20Report%20-%2OFinal.pdf [hereinafter BEST
PRACTICES].
19 See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 5, at 1-2.
20 Id.
21 See, eg., Id. at 3-4.
22 See, e.g., ASSOGESTIONI & EUROPEAN FUND AND ASSET MGMT. Assoc., HEDGE
FUNDS REGULATION IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 3 (2005), available at
http://www.assogestioni.it/index.cfm/3,154,562/05_250845_efama-hdgfnd-rprt 1.
pdf [hereinafter HEDGE FUNDS REGULATION IN EUROPE].
23 See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 5, at 1.
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It is equally important to remember that hedge fund regulation
actually designates different realities and that it may take three
forms. It may refer to regulating the fund itself, regulating the fund
adviser/manager, or regulating the fund's operations. The way hedge
funds are regulated varies from one jurisdiction to another. Some ju-
risdictions regulate hedge fund advisers, whether partially (United
States) or completely (United Kingdom); some regulate the funds di-
rectly (Germany), and some regulate both (France).
This paper challenges the idea that hedge funds need more reg-
ulation. It argues instead that hedge funds need more effective regula-
tion that is flexible and tailored to their specific characteristics and
risks. The development of a better regulatory framework starts with a
better understanding of what hedge funds are, of their role in the fi-
nancial markets, and of the risks they may entail for the stability of
the global financial system, and the impact of current regulatory
frameworks on hedge fund performances. This analysis is necessary
in order to understand the issues at stake and to properly assess the
impact of future reforms.
PART I: HEDGE FUNDS, MARKETS AND LEGAL
ENVIRONMENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT HEDGE
FUND REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
It is a common assumption that hedge funds are lightly regu-
lated investment vehicles that play an important role in financial mar-
kets. Although they tend to make markets more efficient, several
criticisms have led various jurisdictions to consider reforms.
1. Hedge Funds Are Important Market Players That Are Already
Regulated to a Certain Extent
1.1 The Benefits of Hedge Funds for the Financial System
Hedge funds offer investors, fund managers, and markets in
general several benefits and in many respects look more attractive
than traditional vehicles.2 4 First, hedge funds provide investors with
a potential for substantial returns, which are not necessarily corre-
lated to the market, by using a wide range of strategies.2 5 "As such,
hedge funds may be an important diversification tool in an investor's
overall investment portfolio because they minimize overall volatility
and provide access to sectors and strategies not otherwise available.""
24 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at viii.
25 Id.
26 Thomas Lemke et al., Hedge Funds and Other Private Funds :Regulation and
Compliance 2009-2010, 2009.
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Thus, for investors who are willing to risk large sums of money in or-
der to get greater returns, hedge funds are an interesting alternative
to traditional investment vehicles. The exhibit below illustrates this
diversification benefit based on data from 1995 to 2010." Overall, an
investor with 100% of hedge fund interests in her portfolio had an av-
erage return of 11.5% for a 7.4% risk. This yield is substantially better
than an investor with a 96% traditional portfolio whose average return
was lower (9.3%) and whose percentage of risk was higher (12.8%).









83%S HF, 17% Traditional Portfolio
(10.7%,87%)
63% HF, 37%A Traditional Portfolio
(10.2%, 9.9%)
42% HF, 58% Traditional Portfolio
(9.7%, 11.3%)
21% HF, 79% Traditional Portfolio
Hegge Funds are represented by Greenwich Global Hedge Fund Index
Traditional Portfolio - 80% S&P, 20% LBABI
1995-2010
6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11%
Risk (Standard Deviation)
12% 13% 14%
To managers, hedge funds offer an easy-to-set-up structure at
minimal cost. In addition, the compensation mechanism, generally a
2% management fee and 20% performance-based allocation, is very at-
tractive.2 8 Some banks actually blame hedge funds for investment
bankers' high compensation expectations. John Mack, Chairman at
Morgan Stanley, believes that the reason investment bankers are
overpaid is that investment banks "fear a brain drain to better-paying
27 Greenwich Alternative Investments, Diversification Benefits of Hedge Funds,
http://www.greenwichai.com/index.php/hedge-fund-essentials/diversification-
benefits.
28 See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 5, at 1-2.
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hedge funds" and need to compete by raising their compensation
packages.29
Moreover, hedge funds are structured and localized to take ad-
vantage of tax regimes.so In the United States, for instance, they are
structured so as to benefit from a "flow through" tax treatment, which
allows them to avoid income tax at the entity level. 1 Managers are
then taxed only on their capital gains, at a 15% rate, which is substan-
tially less than the rate for regular income taxes.32
Finally, hedge funds bring benefits to the financial markets.
Indeed, they are said to increase liquidity and enhance efficiency.
For instance, hedge funds help provide efficiencies in pricing of securi-
ties in all market conditions thanks to their extensive research and
willingness to make investments. Moreover, by providing a
counterparty to institutions wishing to hedge their risks, hedge funds
often help to disperse risk34 and lower volatility.15 Godeluck and Es-
cande further argue that hedge funds have dynamized the corporate
world. They claim that even activist hedge funds have accelerated the
regeneration of the economic system. 36
1.2 Legal Regimes Applicable to Hedge Funds in the United States
and in the European Union3 7
Hedge funds first appeared a little more than fifty years ago
and have developed in the United States and in the EU thanks to
favorable legal environments." They are often referred to as "unregu-
lated" and "unsupervised" investment vehicles, but I prefer the term
"lightly regulated" and I shall explain why.
29 Mack Says Hedge Funds Driving Up Bank Pay, FINALTERNATIVES, Feb. 25,
2010, http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11555.
30 See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH, supra note 14, at 12.
31 See Lemke et al., supra note 26, at 232.
32 See, David Kocieniewski, House Votes to Eliminate Hedge Fund Tax Breaks,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010. A bill to eliminate the 15% tax rate passed in the
House of Representatives but failed in the Senate.
3 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at viii.
3 See Schwarcz Testimony, supra note 7.
35 BEST PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 27.
36 Solveig Godeluck & Philippe Escande, Les Pirates du Capitalisme: Comment les
Fonds d'investissement Bousculent les Marches, 2008, at 260.
3 Four countries have been selected for their representativeness of the variety of
legal environments in the European Union: The United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and Italy.
3 E.g., Arindam Bandopadhyaya & James L. Grant, A Survey of Demographics
and Performance in the Hedge Fund Industry 4-5 (Univ. of Mass. Fin. Servs. Fo-
rum, Working Paper No. 1011, 2006).
THE FUTURE OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION
Before turning to American and European legal frameworks,
the word "regulation" itself must be defined. Are we referring to the
registration of the fund and its adviser with a regulatory body that
exercises an active oversight or to limitations on transactions and spe-
cial requirements on hedge fund activities? Indeed, in the United
States, one often associates registration and regulation, which is a le-
gitimate thing to do.
Most of the time, registration implies regulation and vice-
versa. In the EU, however, hedge funds are registered almost every-
where. Yet these funds are still said to be unregulated because there
are few, if any, restrictions on their activities. Conversely, the absence
of registration does not mean that hedge funds are completely unregu-
lated, as is the case in the United States.
1.2.1 The United States
The United States is the most popular on-shore location with
nearly two-thirds of global on-shore hedge funds, whether structured
as Limited Partnerships or Limited Liability Corporations.39 It is also
the leading center for location of management, with 68% of global as-
sets,40 among which 41% in the state of New York.4 1 The majority of
U.S.-domiciled assets are managed from New York (60%), followed by
California (15%), Connecticut, Illinois, and Florida (about 6% each).4 2
The American legal framework does not offer any legal defini-
tion for a hedge fund. In its 2003 report on the implications of the
growth of hedge funds, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) regarded this structure as a "pool of securities and perhaps
other assets that does not register its securities offerings under the
Securities Act and which is not registered as an investment company
under the Investment Company Act."4 3
As Robert Jaeger points out, "hedge funds are designed to take
advantage of various exemptions, exclusions, and 'safe harbors' that
are explicitly provided within the regulatory framework."4 4 SEC Com-
missioner Troy Paredes also emphasizes the fact that the resulting
39 IFSL RESEARCH 2010, supra note 1, at 2-3.
40 Id. at 1.
41 Id.
42 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LONDON (IFSL) RESEARCH, HEDGE FUNDS
2009 2 (2009), http://www.thecityuk.com/media/2207/CBS Hedge%20Funds%2020
09.pdf [hereinafter IFSL RESEARCH 2009].
43 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at viii; see also David A. Vaughan, Selected
Definitions of "Hedge Fund," Comments for the U.S. SEC Roundtable on Hedge
Funds (May 14-15, 2003), available at, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/
hedge-vaughn.htm.
44 ROBERT A. JAEGER, ALL ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS: THE EASY WAY TO GET STARTED
181 (2003).
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light regulation of hedge funds is not the product of "shenanigans or of
the exploitation of loopholes."4 5 Ironically, hedge funds must comply
with many laws and regulations as described below in order to qualify
for those exemptions and safe harbors.46
The Investment Company Act of 1940
Unlike other investment companies, hedge funds may avoid re-
gistration with the SEC if they comply with the requirements of one of
the two statutory exemptions set out in the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (ICA), §3(c)(1) and §3(c)(7). 47
Under §3(c)(1), any "issuer whose outstanding securities are
beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons" and who
does not hold himself out to the public is exempted from the definition
of "investment company."4 8 This provision actually enables hedge
funds to have many more investors since beneficial ownership by a
company or another fund counts as beneficial ownership of one person,
provided that they are not set up to circumvent the provisions of the
Act.49
For example, let's assume that investment company A has 50
investors, pension fund B has 150 investors and hedge fund C has 90
clients. If A, B, and C invest in hedge fund Z, hedge fund Z will be
deemed to have 3 clients when really 290 investors will be exposed,
provided that A, B, or C do not hold more than 10% of the outstanding
voting securities of the issuer. This method, used to determine benefi-
cial ownership for the purpose of qualifying for the 3(c)(1) exemption,
has some exceptions. In a 1994 No-Action letter, the SEC stated that a
defined-contribution plan could not be counted as a single investor if
its participants get to make investment decisions.so If participants
play an active role in the plan, then one must "look-through" and each
plan participant must be counted as one towards the 100 investors
limit.
45 Troy A. Paredes, Hedge Funds and the SEC: Observations on the How and Why
of Securities Regulation 4 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Faculty Working Paper Se-
ries, Working Paper No. 07-05-01, 2007).
46 SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDs 87 (2005).
47 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1-80a-64. Exemption 3(c)(7)
was introduced by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.
Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 209, 110 Stat. 3416, 3432 (1996).
48 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).
4 Cornish and Carey Commercial, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 422641,
at *3 (Jun. 21, 1996).
5o PanAgora Group Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 174138, at *6 (Apr. 29,
1994).
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The second exemption, §3(c)(7), was introduced in the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 and has become popular
since it allows hedge funds to offer their securities to an unlimited
number of "qualified purchasers.""
However, one caveat should be mentioned. Even though
§3(c)(7) does not set a maximum number of qualified purchasers,
§12(g) of the 1934 Act imposes registration and reporting require-
ments if the fund has more 500 or more investors.5 2 In order to benefit
from the exemption, in practice, hedge funds have a maximum of 499
investors.
The look-through issue was also raised for 3(c)(7) funds in sev-
eral instances. It was, for instance, raised when trying to determine
whether a benefit retirement could be a qualified purchaser or if a
hedge fund had to look-through to determine whether each participant
was qualified. The SEC concluded that a defined benefit retirement
plan is deemed a qualified purchaser if plan participants cannot make
investment decisions and if the decision to invest in a 3(c)(7) fund is
made solely by the plan fiduciary.5  In this instance, if plan partici-
pants had been able to direct their investments to specific alternatives,
then the 3(c)(7) fund would have had to look-through and evaluate
each participant's level of sophistication.
51 A "'Qualified Purchaser' means-i) any natural person (including any person
who holds a joint, community property, or other similar shared ownership interest
in an issuer that is excepted under section 3(c)(7) with that person's qualified pur-
chaser spouse) who owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments, as defined by
the Commission; ii) any company that owns not less than $5,000,000 in invest-
ments and that is owned directly or indirectly by or for 2 or more natural persons
who are related as siblings or spouse (including former spouses), or direct lineal
descendants by birth or adoption, spouses of such persons, the estates of such per-
sons, or foundations, charitable organizations, or trusts established by or for the
benefit of such persons; iii) any trust that is not covered by clause (ii) and that was
not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, as to which
the trustee or other person authorized to make decisions with respect to the trust,
and each settlor or other person who has contributed assets to the trust, is a per-
son described in clause (i), (ii), or (iv); or (iv) any person, acting for its own account
or the accounts of other qualified purchasers, who in the aggregate owns and in-
vests on a discretionary basis, not less than $25,000,000 in investments." 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A).
52 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g), 15 U.S.C § 78(l)(g).
5 Standish, Ayer & Wood, Inc. Stable Value Group Trust, SEC No-Action Letter,
1995 WL 765406, at *5 (Dec. 28, 1995).
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The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The alternative way to regulate the hedge fund industry is to
regulate hedge fund advisers. In the United States, the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA) regulates investment advisers.5"
The IAA imposes fiduciary duties. One of the most important
duties imposed, developed by the Supreme Court of the United States
in 1963 in SEC v. Capital Gains Research, establishes an "affirmative
duty of 'utmost good faith and full and fair disclosure.""' Equally im-
portant is the duty of advisers to seek the best execution for their cli-
ent." Advisers must disclose conflicts of interest, report personal
transactions," keep records of their trades,5 8 establish, maintain, and
enforce a code of ethics, 9 and must not engage in transactions which
operate fraudulentlyo nor make untrue statements of material fact"
to investors or in their ADV form filed with the SEC.6 2
To ensure hedge funds comply with the various legal require-
ments imposed upon them, the SEC introduced Rule 206(4)-7. This
rule requires each investment adviser registered, or required to regis-
ter with the Commission, "to adopt and implement policies and proce-
dures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the federal
securities laws, review those policies and procedures annually for their
adequacy and effectiveness of their implementation, and appoint a
Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) to be responsible for administering
the policies and procedures."6 ' Rule 206(4)-7 placed part of the compli-
ance responsibility on the industry, along with the costs it entails, and
away from the SEC, which was lacking resources to examine
thousands of registered investment advisers.6 4
54 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C § 80b-1-80b-21.
55 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
56 NASD Notice 01-22, 2001 WL 278615 (Mar. 16, 2001).
5 15 U.S.C. 80a-4; SEC Books and Records to be Maintained by Investment Ad-
visers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a)(12) (2009).
5 Id., § 204-2.
5 Id., § 204A-1.
61 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1, 80b-6. Note that §206(2) does not require scienter, showing
negligence is sufficient.
61 Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986) (setting the standard that a
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider it important in making an investment decision).
62 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7.
63 Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers , In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 25,925, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2107, 79 SEC Docket 1696 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/ic-25925.htm.
64 Id.
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Besides additional costs, internal compliance may also lead to
internal conflict of interests. For example, it is the responsibility of
the CCO to establish procedures to detect and prevent violations." If
these procedures are too stringent, however, they may handcuff the
regular course of business. One may also question the conflict of inter-
est a CCO encounters when she detects a fraud. Should she report it
at the risk of losing her position? There seems to be an incentive from
a CCO's point of view to stay quiet.
In this regard, the SEC's enforcement cooperation initiative,
launched on January 13, 2010, which resembles the initiative put
forth by the Department of Justice. The initiative should be ap-
plauded as it "establishes incentives for individuals and companies to
fully and truthfully cooperate and assist with SEC investigations and
enforcement actions, and provides new tools to help investigators de-
velop first-hand evidence to build the strongest possible cases.""
Hedge fund advisers meet the definition of an "Investment Ad-
viser"" and should technically register" under the IAA and report to
the SEC through Form ADV. Today, a large majority of hedge funds
advisers are registered, yet some escape this regulatory oversight. In-
deed, Section 203(b) of the IAA provides a list of exemptions from the
registration requirement." Hedge fund advisers rely on the de
minimis exemption of Section 203(b)(3).70 Under this provision, in-
vestment advisers who have fewer than 15 clients during the preced-
ing 12 months, who do not hold themselves out generally to the public,
and who are not advisers for a registered investment company, need
not be registered, although some advisers choose to do it on voluntary
basis." The limit of 15 clients is often regarded as artificial. Under
this exemption, for instance, 14 other funds, each representing up to
499 investors, may invest in a hedge fund without triggering a regis-
65 Id.
66 Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals and
Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm.
67 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) ("'Investment adviser' means any person who, for com-
pensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as
part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning
securities.").
68 Id., § 80b-3(c). Note that once registered with the SEC, there is no need to
register under state laws. Id., § 80b-3A(b).
69 Id., § 80b-3(b).
70 Id., § 80b-3(b)(3).
71 Id.
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tration requirement on its adviser, because the clients would be the
funds and not each individual investor behind these funds.
In 2004, the SEC challenged the term "client" and introduced
§203(b)(3)-2(a), the so-called "Hedge Fund Rule."7 2 It argued that "cli-
ent" referred to "investor" and that one should look-through in order to
calculate the number of clients.7 3 In our example, if 14 funds repre-
senting 499 investors each invested in one hedge fund, 6,986 investors
would be taken into account. As a result of the introduction of the
Hedge Fund Rule, all hedge fund advisers had to register with the
SEC by February 1, 2006. However, in June 2006, in Goldstein v.
SEC, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined
that the Hedge Fund Rule was an "arbitrary" provision.74
Yet, as Part II analyzes in greater detail, the mandatory regis-
tration of all hedge fund advisers is very likely to become a reality if
the Private Fund Investment Adviser Registration Act is enacted. The
Act eliminates the "15 client" exemption and compels all investment
managers to register under the IAA.
The Securities Act of 1933
Interests in a hedge fund are securities under the definition of
§2(a)(1)7 ' and under the Howey76 test, which technically makes hedge
funds fall under the scope of the Securities Act of 1933 ("the 1933
Act").7 7 As previously mentioned, hedge funds cannot hold themselves
72 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004).
7 Id.
74 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
7 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) ("The term 'security' means any
note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collat-
eral-trust certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a se-
curity, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.").
76 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
77 15 U.S.C. § 77a.
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to the public, 78 engage in general solicitation, or advertise in the ab-
sence of a pre-existing relationship.
Therefore, securities may only be offered using the private of-
fering exemption under §4(2) of the 1933 Act."o Hedge funds typically
use the safe harbor provision of Regulation D's Rule 506" to carry out
their offering. Using this safe harbor is not mandatory if the condi-
tions of §4(2) are met, although advisers usually prefer Rule 506.82 It
allows them to privately offer securities to a maximum of 35 sophisti-
cated purchasers and an unlimited number of "accredited investors,"
as defined by Rule 501(a) of the 1933 Act."
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Hedge funds typically do not need to register under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") because they are regarded as
traders.8 4 If they were treated as dealers, they would have to regis-
ter under §15b of the 1934 Act.8 6 The Exchange Act contains an-
tifraud provisions (§10b and Rule 10b-5) that apply to all investment
advisers, whether registered or not.8 7 These provisions impose a fidu-
ciary duty to disclose material facts and prohibit material misstate-
78 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (establishing the test to
determine if an offering is public or private. One must check if investors are able
to fend for themselves to determine if the offering is private.
7 Although general solicitation is prohibited, this remark needs to be moderate as
more flexible provisions exist. For instance, advertising using models for instance
is not prohibited per se like it used to be. In its Clover Capital Management No-
Action Letter, the SEC presents eleven factors that provide guidance on how to
deal with models. Clover Capital Mgmt. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL
67379, at *3 (Oct. 28, 1986). These models do not constitute a safe harbor. Id.
Another example is the use of a website which destroys the private offering exemp-
tion. This is considered as general solicitation unless the website has a password
restricted access available to accredited investors only and there is a quiet period
long enough to establish a preexisting relationship prior to the offering.
80 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). Rule 901 of Regulation S provides that an offer is not
deemed to include offers which occurred outside the United States for the purposes
of Section 5 of the 1933 Act. Regulation S, Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made
Outside the United States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933,
17 C.F.R. 230.901 (2005).
8 Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. 230.506 (2009).
82 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
83 17 C.F.R. 230.501.
84 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
8 15 U.S.C. § 78c-(a)(1). The SEC stated in its 2003 staff report that some hedge
funds are registered as dealers. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 18. For a
definition of "dealer" under the Exchange Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 78c-(a)(5).
86 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 18.
87 15 U.S.C. § 78j-(b).
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ments and omissions. Moreover, registered funds are subject to
periodic requirements under §13,88 proxy rules under §14,'89 and in-
sider reporting requirements and short swing profits transactions
rules under §16 of the 1934 Act.90
Other Regulatory Requirements
In addition to complying with federal securities laws, hedge
funds may be required to comply with federal laws, rules, and regula-
tions.9 1 For example, a hedge fund that engages in a single commodity
futures transaction is subject to the Commodity Exchange Act and the
rules promulgated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC).9 2 In addition, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) requires broker-dealers selling hedge funds to comply with
five sets of principles under NASD rules.9' Furthermore, the Employ-
ment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) requires investment
advisors to be subject to the restrictions of an ERISA fiduciary if more
than 25% of the value of any class of equity interest in the hedge fund
is held by an employee benefit plan.9 4
Hedge funds are also subject to several Treasury Department
regulations.9 ' For example, hedge funds with a large position in U.S
Treasury securities or foreign currencies positions above a designated
dollar equivalent threshold must be reported to Federal Reserve Bank
of New York.9" Moreover, hedge funds are financial institutions sub-
ject to the anti-money laundering requirements set out in Section 352
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,9 which compels hedge funds to de-
velop internal control programs, to designate a compliance officer, to
set an ongoing employee training program, and to have an indepen-
dent audit to test the program."
88 15 U.S.C. § 78m. In particular, hedge funds are subject to beneficial ownership
reporting under §13(d) and 13(g) and to quarterly reporting requirements under
§ 13(f) when accounts exceed $100 million in fair value. Id.
89 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
90 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
91 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
92 Id. Certain individuals providing futures advice to a hedge fund may be exempt
from portions of the Commodity Exchange Act's operational requirements if they
comply with the requirements of CFTC Rule 4.7. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.7 (2010).
93 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
94 Id. at 28; see ERISA Rule 3-101 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101 (2010).
95 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
9 Id. at 29-30.
97 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 352, 115
Stat. 272, 322.
98 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 30, n. 108.
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Finally, hedge funds may also be subject to state laws known
as "Blue Sky" laws. Even though state laws do not regulate hedge
funds' operations, states may regulate advisers, offers, and sales of in-
terests and may impose additional and stricter antifraud provisions""
and notice filing requirements."' For example, Connecticut is cur-
rently considering imposing new reporting requirements on state-
based hedge funds."
1.2.2 The European Union
Investment funds in the EU are classified into two categories.
The first category consists of funds that meet and follow the require-
ments set by the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transfera-
ble Securities (UCITS) Directive and are authorized to sell to the retail
market. 10 2 The second category is the default category and encom-
passes all non-UCITS funds, including hedge funds, private equity
funds, commodity funds or real estate funds.10 3 These investments
are regarded as entailing risk levels unsuitable for retail investors.104
Access to these funds is therefore limited to sophisticated, profes-
sional, and institutional investors. 0 ' In addition, non-UCITS funds
do not benefit from the EU passport that would allow them to market
throughout the internal market. 106
The graph below illustrates the evolution of the assets under
management in Europe in UCITS, in non-UCITS funds, and, within
the non-UCITS category, in hedge funds. 0 7
At the end of 2009, the approximately 1,400 European-based
hedge funds estimated that their EU managed assets amounted to
$382 billionos (23% of the global market share) while assets domiciled
9 See N.Y. General Business Law §§ 353, 358 (McKinney 2011). The Martin Act
of 1921 empowers the New York State Attorney General to bring both civil and
criminal actions for financial fraud.
100 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at at 30-31.
101 Connecticut Considers State Hedge Fund Regulation, FINALTERNATIVES, Feb.
26, 2010, http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11579.
102 Press Release, European Union, Financial Services: Commission Proposes EU
Framework for Managers of Alternative Investment Funds (Apr. 29, 2009), availa-
ble at http://europe.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/669. Direc-




106 See, e.g., CHARLES RIVER Assocs., IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED AIFM DIRECTIVE
ACROSS EUROPE 43 (2009), available at http://www.crai.com/ProfessionalStaff/Aux
ListingDetails.aspx?id=11778&flD=34.
107 Id. at 11.
108 IFSL RESEARCH 2010, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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FIGURE 1. VALUE OF ASSETS UNDER MANAGEMENT FOR UCITS
AND NON-UCITS FUNDS MANAGED IN EUROPE
SHedge funds 0 Non18 (ITS exludmag hedge funde 13(2ITS
6,0 0 0.................
&5.000-t"
Source: European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA), Hedge
Fund Research (HFR) and CRA.
in the EU roughly amounted to $84 billion.000 There is a large discrep-
ancy between the amount of assets managed in the U.K. and the
amount of assets domiciled in the U.K. Although the U.K. is a major
hub for hedge fund managers, the funds themselves are often located
offshore for tax reasons.11o These figures are indicative of what regu-
lators should target in the EU.
Because regulations are promulgated on the national level,
regulation varies across EU member states. The United Kingdom ap-
proach focuses on regulation of investment advisors only."'* Ger-
many, on the other hand, only regulates funds, while France and Italy
regulate both investment advisors and the funds themselves.11-2 Al
though some convergences may be observed on the types of documents
required, 113 many features of hedge fund regulation"14 also differ be-
109 CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 13. This data has been converted
from Euro to USD as of October 31, 2009.
110 Id. at 108. See IFSL RESEARCH 2010, supra note 1, at 8.
111 See IFSL RESEARCH 2010, supra note 1, at 8.
112 See Id.
113 See HEDGE FUNDS REGULATION IN EUROPE, supra note 22, at 6. A survey con-
ducted in 2005 showed that member states require the same information docu-
ments specified in Directive 85/611 for UCITS.114 Note that funds of hedge funds regulations ("FoHF") also vary from country to
country. However, FoHFs are beyond the scope of this paper.
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tween EU member states. For example, Italy imposes a minimum
subscription of 500,000 for hedge fund investors, France has various
monetary thresholds and qualitative requirements depending on the
type of fund and its legal form, and Germany has neither monetary
nor qualitative requirements for hedge fund investors."'
1.2.3 The United Kingdom
After the state of New York, London is the world's second larg-
est center for hedge fund management and the leading center in Eu-
rope.' The U.K. hedge fund sector employed approximately 40,000
people and managed approximately $382 billion in hedge fund assets
in 2009, which represented 21% of global hedge fund assets and 76% of
European hedge fund assets."17 In the U.K., hedge fund regulation
focuses on the regulation of hedge fund managers who must seek the
authorization of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) pursuant to
§ 19 of the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000. As mentioned
above, the U.K. is not a domicile of choice for hedge funds because of
its tax regime,"18 although some hedge funds do exist in this
jurisdiction." 9
The FSA has a broad, principle-based and approach to regula-
tion that is very different from the American rules-based and hedge
fund-specific approach. This means that every regulated entity must
follow the eleven "Principles for Business" of the FSA Handbook of
115 Associazione Italiana Del Risparmio Gestito and European Fund and Asset
Management Association, Hedge Funds Regulation in Europe: A Comparative Sur-
vey, November 2005, available at http://www.assogestioni.it/index.cfmi/3,154,562/
05_250845_efama-hdgfnd_rprt_1.pdf; HEDGE FUNDS REGULATION IN EUROPE,
supra note 22, at 6.
116 IFSL RESEARCH 2010, supra note 1, at 1-3.
117 Id.
118 PHOEBUS ATHANAsSIou, HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS, 146, n. 104 (2009). U.K domiciled funds
are liable for U.K Corporation tax on income plus chargeable capital gains.
119 In the U.K., hedge funds may take several forms and can be broadly divided
into two categories: FSA-authorized funds and unauthorized funds. Authorized
funds typically fall into two legal structures: Authorized Unit Trusts ("AUTs") (Fi-
nancial Services and Markets Act of 2000) and Investment Companies with Varia-
ble Capital ("ICVCs") (Open-Ended Investment Companies Regulations of 2001).
Within the authorized funds category, a specific form may be chosen. Hedge fund
managers may decide within one of the above-mentioned legal forms to set up a
"Qualified Investor Scheme" ("QIS"), introduced in 2004 and not available to the
general public, a "Futures and Options Fund" ("FOF"), or a "Geared Futures and
Options Fund" ("GFOF"), which is available to the general public through the Non-
UCITS Retail Scheme category. Unauthorized funds may take the form of an Un-
authorized Unit Trust or of a closed-ended corporation.
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Rules and Guidance. 12 0 These principles are not intended specifically
for hedge funds but for all FSA-regulated entities. This led to the crea-
tion of the Hedge Fund Working Group, whose goal was to provide the
industry guidance on what the FSA Principles should mean for hedge
fund managers. 12 1 Provided that these principles are properly en-
forced, hedge fund managers are relatively free to carry out any type of
strategy because there is no particular constraint on investments.
Notwithstanding the above, U.K. hedge fund advisers are subject to
MiFID 12 2 capital adequacy rules based on their activities, while hedge
funds themselves are not. 12 3
The FSA's approach to supervision of hedge fund managers is
risk-based. It conducts periodic risk assessments through a process
called ARROW 11,124 during which the FSA examines various ele-
ments such as management, governance, financial reports or the
amount of capital held, or targets a specific issue. 125 Enforcement fol-
lows an outcome-based approach where the FSA assesses ex post the
decisions made by managers, and then take enforcement action if
needed.
Finally, similar to other jurisdictions, it is generally prohibited
to market unregulated collective investment schemes and regulated
"Qualified Investor Schemes" to the general public,12 6 which may only
be promoted to eligible investors after ensuring the investor's wealth
and sophistication.
1.2.4 France
In France, hedge funds are known as fonds spiculatifs or fonds
alternatifs. Hedge funds were introduced in France with funds invest-
ing in futures, Fonds Communs d'Intervention sur les Marchis <' Terme
(FCIMT).
120 FSA, FSA Handbook,http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/PRIN/2/1.
121 See, e.g., Stuart J. Kaswell & Paul N. Roth, The Changing Regulatory Frame-
work for Hedge Funds and Managers, in HEDGE FUNDs 2009, at 91, 111 (PLI Cor-
porate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 18643 2009).
122 Council Directive 2004/39 2004 O.J. (L 145/1).
123 Martin Cornish, in INTERNATIONAL GUIDE To HEDGE FUND REGULATION 491
(Martin Cornish & Ian Mason eds., 2009).
124 FSA, Operating Framework, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/Ap-
proach/Framework/.
125 Id. at 510; Martin Cornish, in INTERNATIONAL GrIDE To HEDGE FUND REGULA-
TION 491 (Martin Cornish & Ian Mason eds., 2009).
126 An unauthorized person acting in the course of business must not communi-
cate an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity in the UK unless
an exemption applies. Financial Services & Markets Act (FMSA), 2000, c. 8, § 21
(Eng.). The promotion of collection investment schemes are restricted to the gen-
eral public. Id., § 238.
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In 2003, the Financial Security Actl 2 7 set up a legal framework
by creating two additional legal schemes: OPCVM ARIA,121 whether
leveraged or unleveraged (undertaking for collective investment in
transferable securities with simplified investment rules), and OPCVM
contractuels12 9 (contractual undertaking for collective investment in
transferable securities). Hedge funds may operate through these legal
forms'o that are regarded as non-UCITS funds under European Law.
The sales of hedge fund units or shares are subject to a general prohi-
bition of solicitation"a' and they cannot be accessed unless various cri-
teria are met, especially in respect to "qualified investors." These
criteria are defined by decree' 32 and codified in Article D.411-2 of the
Code mondtaire et financier (Monetary and Financial Code).1 33
Natural persons may invest in hedge funds whatever their le-
gal form, if allowed to, by being registered on records by the AMF or if
at least two of the following criteria are met: (i) the size of the inves-
tor's financial instruments portfolio exceeds C 500,000; (ii) the investor
has carried out transactions which amounted C600 each at an average
frequency of at least ten per trimester over the previous year; or (iii)
has worked for at least one year in the financial sector in a position
that requires knowledge of securities investment.
Retail investment to hedge funds, though limited, is possible
under certain circumstances.
The following chart summarizes the French legal framework
and aims at providing a clearer picture of a complex environment.
127 Financial Security Act (Loi de S6curit6 Financibre), Law No. 2003-706 of Aug.
1, 2003 [hereinafter FSA].
128 Monetary and Financial Code (Code Mon6taire et Financier), arts. L.214-34 &
L.234-35-1 (2005), available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=25
&r=7606 hereinafter MFC].
129 MFC arts. L.214-35-2-234.35-6 (2005), available at http://195.83.177.9/code/
liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=25&r=7607.
13o See Jean Frangois Adelle, France, in INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO HEDGE FUND
REGULATION, supra note 123, at 112.
131 MFC Article L341-1 provides a definition of Banking and Financial Solicita-
tion. MFC art. L341-1. Contacts with Qualified Investors qualify as exemptions
from the general prohibition on solicitation.
132 Decree n'2007-904 May, 15 2007 which came into force on November 1, 2007.
133 MFC, art. D.411-2.
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Information
Legal form Access provided Operations Role of the AMF
FCIMT (funds Qualified Investors Investors must ac- Diversification Subject to the re-
investing in MFC art. D.411-2. knowledge that 10% ceiling on se- quirement of prior
futures) + non qualified in- they receive proper curities issued by AMF operational
dividual investors warning that the same issuer license.
whose initial sub- FCIMT are to be except if the issuer
scription amounts considered as is an OECD mem-
C 10,000 or hedge funds, entail ber state.
more.'13 The per- risks of significant
son who signs the loss and are avail-
prospectus must able to a certain
ensure that these category of inves-
conditions are met. tors. 13 5
Investors receive a
detailed note and





content is set by
the AMF. 13 7
Unleveraged Qualified Inves- Investors must ac- Exemptions from Subject to the re-
OPCVM ARIA tors1 38 + list set knowledge that the risk diversifi- quirement of prior
by Article 413-2 of they receive proper cation requirement AMF operational
the MFC. Non warning that applicable to stan- license.
qualified investors OPCVMs are dard OPCVMs. Programs of opera-
may access if available to a cer- May invest their tions need not be
> initial subscrip- tain category of in- assets in: approved by the
tion of C 125000 or vestors '3 . Inves- > Up to 35% in AMF
more tors receive a pro- stocks issued by
> initial subscrip- spectus that must the same issuer
tion of C10,000 or be approved by the > Up to 50% in the
more when hold AMF. The liquida- same collective in-
total of Cimillion tive value must be vestment scheme.
or more in depos- provided every > Up to 20% in
its, life insurance month.' 4 0  French or foreign
products and fi- alternative funds
nancial instru- > Up to 50% in
ments other financial in-
> initial subscrip- struments
tion of C 10,000 or Leverage of two
more and profes-
sional position for




134 AMF General Regulation, Article 416-2 Autorit6 Des Marches Financiers Gen.
Reg., art. 416-2.
135 Id., art. 416-5.
136 Id., art. 411-51.
13 Id., art. 416-10.
1381 MFC art. D.411-2.
139 Autorite Des Marches Financiers Gen. Reg., art. 413-6.
140 Id., art. 413-10.




+ non qualified in-
vestors if
> initial subscrip-
tion of C 250000 or
more
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tion of C30,000 or
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total of C1million






tion of C30,000 or
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available to a cer-
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vestors. Investors
receive a prospec-
tus that need not
be authorized by







> Up to 351/ in
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same collective in-
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In addition to these provisions, French hedge funds, like those
in the United States, are subject to antifraud provisions pursuant to
the European Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market ma-
nipulation. 14 2 They are also subject to national provisions detailed in
the AMF General Regulation. The AMF also introduced Conduct of
Business rules for portfolio management companies, which are en-
forced by its Commission des sanctions in the event of a breach.14 3
These rules address conflicts of interest, due skill, care and diligence,and integrity of the market, to name a few examples. 144
141 MFC art. D.411-2.
142 See, e.g., CEFIC, THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COMMENTS ON THE COMMISSION
CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE MARKETS IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS DIREC-
TIVE 5 (2011), available athttp://www.cefic.org/Documents/PolicyCentre/Cefic
Comments Markets Financial InstrumentlDirective MIFID_.pdf.
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Though they are not as regulated as other investment vehicles,
French hedge funds must register and are regulated to a certain ex-
tent. 1 4 5 Although the control exercised by the AMF appears to be ben-
eficial from an investor protection point of view, it may also be one of
the reasons for the lack of competitiveness and dynamism of the
French hedge fund market.
1.2.5 Italy
In Italy, hedge funds are referred to as fondi speculativi"' and
may be open or close-ended. Italy is a dynamic market for hedge funds
and was one of the first jurisdictions to adopt specific hedge fund rules
in a Treasury Ministry Decree in May 1999 that was modified in 2000,
2003, and 2005 and developed through regulations of the Bank of It-
aly.147 By 2005, the Italian hedge fund market consisted of 161 funds
and was worth C 17 billion.'4 8
A flexible legal environment, beneficial to hedge funds, may ex-
plain this dynamism. Like France, Italy requires investment advisers
to be authorized by the Bank of Italy,14 9 and hedge funds themselves
cannot be distributed unless they have received the authorization of
the market regulator, the Commissione Nazionale per le Societai e la
Borsa ("COSOB").15 0 While advisers are subject to capital require-
ments, hedge funds themselves are not. Foreign non-UCITS funds
145 See, e.g., Bfinance, Hedge Fund Observer: Despite a National Regulation, the
French Hedge Fund Industry is Primarily About Multimanagement, http://www.
bfinance.co.uk/content/view/12007/1000242/.
146 See, e.g., ALTERNATIVE INV. MGMT. Assoc., A SURVEY INTO THE ITALIAN HEDGE
FUND MARKET, FROM A PARTICIPANT'S PERSPECTIVE 7 (2006) [hereinafter AIMA
SURVEY].
147 Regolamento recante norme per la determinazione dei criteri generali cui
devono essere uniformati i fondi comuni di investimento(adottato dal Ministro del
tesoro, del bilancio e della programmazione economica con decreto del 24 maggio
1999, n. 228 e successivamente modificato con decreto del 22 maggio 2000, n. 180;
con decreto del 31 gennaio 2003, n. 47 e con decreto del 14 ottobre 2005, n. 256,
available at: http://www.consob.it/main/documenti/Regolamentazione/normatival
mt228n.htm; Provvedimento della Banca d'Italia, Regolamento sulla gestione col-
lettiva del risparmio, April 14, 2005 available at: http://www.bancaditalia.it/vigi-
lanza/intermediari/normativalsgr-oicr/provv/Regolamento.pdf.
148 Cristina Calderoni, Hedge Funds in Italy: An Update (2006), available at:
http://www.aima.org/en/knowledge-centre/education/aima-journal/past-articles/
index.cfm/jid/4E2 1 1FB5-FEE2-480C-868576C66BA41EA5.
149 AILMA SURviY, supra note 146, at 7.
150 E.g,, CONSOB-What It Is and What It Does, http://www.consob.it/mainen/
consob/what/what.html?symblink=/Mainen/consob/what/index.html.
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that want to distribute in Italy must comply with the same authoriza-
tion requirements."'
Typically, hedge funds are managed by Societi di Gestione del
Risparmio (SGR), which, until June 2007, had to be speculative
SGRs. 52 This requirement has since been removed,"" allowing com-
mon SGRs to now manage hedge funds.'
In order to secure authorization, funds must disclose specific
warnings and information. This includes the fund owned asset class
and the procedure related to the investors' access.' But, unlike
French regulation, this authorization, once granted, allows Italian
funds to invest in any type of financial instruments and use any in-
vestment strategy, without constraints set by the Bank of Italy or port-
folio diversification requirements. 156
Italy also prohibits marketing to the general public. 1 7 An in-
vestor cannot invest in a hedge fund if the initial subscription is below
a threshold of C500 000.158 Until recently, Italian law also provided
that hedge funds could not have more than 200 investors, but this pro-
vision has been repealed, and today there is no restriction on the maxi-
mum number of investors.1 5 9
Consequently, Italian hedge funds are very lightly regulated
and may carry out any investments they want, provided that they find
investors who can satisfy the C500,000 initial investment
requirement.
1.2.6 Germany
Sondervermigen mit zusttzlichen Risiken ("Hedgefonds") (spe-
cial investment schemes with additional risks) have a new legal frame-
work since the Investmentgesetz (InvG),1 60 which governs German
collective investment schemes, came into force in 2004.
151 See, e.g., CAPITAL MARKETS: SECURITIES MARKET REGULATION, INT'L FIN. L.
REv., Apr. 8, 2002, http://www.iflr.com/Article/2027190/Channel/193438/Capital-
markets-Securities-market-regulation.html.





155 Id. at 2.
156 ATHANASSIOU, supra note 118, at 134.
157 KPMG, supra note 152, at 3.
158 Id. at 2.
159 Id. at 3.
160 Investmentgesetz [Investment Act], Jan. 1, 2004 (F.R.G.), available at http://
bundesrecht.juris.de/invg [hereinafter InvG]. The main provision on hedge fund
may be fund at Section112 (Chapter 4). InvG § 112.
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Unlike other jurisdictions, German law provides its own legal
definition of the term hedge fund: "A fund is considered a hedge fund if
it uses either leverage or short selling strategies or both and is not
restricted in the choice of its assets."16 1
German hedge funds may take two legal forms. They can either
be structured as investment funds (contractual form) managed by an
investment management companyl62 or as investment stock corpora-
tions (corporate form)."' In Germany, hedge funds need to obtain the
written license of the regulator Bundesanstalt ffir Finanzdienstleis-
tungsaufsicht ("BaFin") prior to taking up any business.1 4
Whether contractual or corporate, hedge funds may only market and
distribute through private placement.'16  Additionally, they must fol-
low the rules applicable to prospectuses, which must be written, con-
tain the fund rules, and contain a warning for the possibility of total
loss.' 6 6 BaFin must approve the contractual terms.167 Similarly, for-
eign funds can only be sold to German investors in a private
placement.
German hedge funds are subject to minimum capital require-
ments,16 8 but advisers are not. The rationale behind capital require-
ments is the same as for banks. It provides a "cushion against existing
obligations when asset values sharply decline."' 6 ' Like any fund, they
161 Harald Plewka & Barbara Schmid, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO
HEDGE FUND REGULATION, supra note 123, at 131-32 (quoting Article 112 of the
InvG).
162 See InvG § 30. Note that in the contractual form, hedge funds are a separate
estate owned by investors and which needs to be managed by an investment man-
agement company. The corporate form on the other hand is a uniform legal estate,
which can manage clients' money on its own.
163 Id.
164 InvG §§ 7, 97.
165 See, e.g., SIlEARMAN & STERLING LLP, NEw GERMAN RULES FOR HEDGE FUNDS
AND FOREIGN FUNDS: AMENDED PROPOsALs AFTER FINANCE COMMITTEE HEARING 3




167 InvG §§ 7, 97.
168 See Plewka & Schmid, supra note 161, at 133.
169 HAL ScoTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION
884 (16th ed. 2009). Note, however, that a distinction must be made between capi-
tal reserves and liquidity reserves. Indeed, as demonstrated in Rama Cont, Amal
Moussa, & Andreea Minca, Too Interconnected to Fail: Contagion and Systemic
Risk in Financial Networks (Columbia Ctr. for Fin. Eng'g, Working Paper, 2009).
"[W]hen Bear Stearns defaulted in 2008, its capital reserve where above the mini-
mal regulatory capital required by Basel II, but was not available (liquid) for meet-
ing margin call." The authors argue that imposing liquidity reserves ratios
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must comply with the principle of risk diversification, although no for-
mal limits are imposed upon them. They also enjoy a very flexible le-
gal environment in terms of investment strategies. The use of
leverage and derivative-based transactions are not controlled, which is
quite similar to the Italian legal framework. However, Plewka and
Schmid note that the InvG empowers the Ministry of Finance to re-
strict the use of leverage and short-selling transactions by an execu-
tive order in order to prevent abuse and protect the integrity of capital
markets. 170
Moreover, unlike hedge fund regulation in Italy, the type of as-
sets in which German hedge funds may invest in is restricted. For
instance, hedge funds may not invest in raw materials or in real prop-
erty. 17 ' Likewise, they may not invest more than 30% of the value of
the fund in equity interests in businesses that are not listed on a stock
exchange. 1 72 Additionally, they may not invest more than 50% of the
net assets in another hedge fund in which not more than 10% are held
by a single fund.1 73
Finally, in Germany there is no qualitative requirement or
quantitative threshold restricting access to hedge funds, unlike other
jurisdictions.
As this quick overview and the following chart demonstrate,
there is no common approach between the EU and the United States.
The current legal regimes applicable to hedge funds are determined on
a national level, even within the EU, where one might expect a uni-
form approach.
Jurisdiction Regulation174 of hedge funds Regulation of hedge fund advisers
United States X X
(Investment Company Act ex- (if meet the criteria of the Invest-
emption) ment Advisers Act exemption)




reduces the probability of large systemic losses and reduces default contagion and
that it should be the tool used to regulate contagion and systemic risk. Id.
170 Plewka & Schmid, supra note 161, at 134.
171 InvG § 67(1).
172 Id., § 67(4).
173 Id., § 112.
174 As demonstrated in this section, the term "regulation" designates different
realities and the degree to which funds or advisers are regulated varies a great
deal from one country to the other.
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If there is one common belief shared by regulators and politi-
cians on both sides of the Atlantic, it is the idea that hedge funds are
potentially problematic entities because they are insufficiently regu-
lated. Still, disagreements have emerged and two factions seem to ex-
ist. On one side is the U.S.-U.K. approach, while on the other is the
EU-dominant France-Germany axis. The idea that hedge funds
should be regulated comes from excessive criticism as well as from
valid concerns about market stability.
2. Criticisms and Concerns in the Context of the Current Crisis
Have Led Governments to Take Action
2.1 Hedge Funds Are Criticized Investment Vehicles
There is a global consensus that hedge funds did not cause the
recent financial crisis. According to the International Financial Ser-
vices London (IFSL), only around 5% of hedge fund assets were in-
vested in mortgage-backed securities in September 2007.175 Although
they were the victims, not the perpetrators, hedge funds were demon-
ized and treated as scapegoats.
The industry suffers from bad press and prejudices. Mislead-
ing, but widely distributed, essays based on neither legal nor scientific
facts have described hedge funds' activities as "criminal activities"
based on insider trading.1 7 ' This bad press mayalso be due to political
leaders' attacks on hedge funds. Hedge funds are often associated
with volatility, short selling,1 7 7 empty voting, 171 short-termism, activ-
ism, tax avoidance,'17 and risky behaviors with the potential to affect
market stability. Although some of these criticisms are not without
merit, the way hedge funds function and their role in the markets are
often misunderstood and reduced to the shareholder activism context.
175 IFSL RESEARCH 2009, supra note 42, at 7; www.ifsl.org.uk
176 JOHN R. TAIBoTT, THE 86 BIGGIEST LiEs ON WALL STREET 202-203 (2009).
177 Events in October 2008 provide a good example of how hedge funds use and
may suffer from short selling. Hedge funds lost an estimate of $15 billion in a few
hours based on their large short positions in Volkswagen's stock, which soared to
more than 1000 due to a Porsche takeover attempt through cash-settled options.
For more details see e.g A.Gennarino, R.Roman, & A.Rivibre, Investment Opportu-
nities in Germany, France, and the U.K in Replication of the VW/Porsche Strat-
egy, Harvard Law School (International Finance, Markets and Firms paper under
the supervision of Professor Mihir Desai), 2009, at 10.
178 See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CoR. FIN. 343 (2007).
179 The tax avoidance argument that frowns upon the existence of offshore funds
is not really justified, because contrary to a general belief, offshore funds are not
designed to circumvent taxation but rather to provide investment opportunities to
individuals who are already tax-exempt, such as foreign investors.
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Indeed, the general public has become aware of the existence of hedge
funds essentially through takeover attempts extensively reported in
newspapers. This has contributed to the development of a generalized
anti-hedge fund sentiment and has led the general public, namely vot-
ers in the United States or Europe, to call for more regulation. As a
result, the industry is under heavy fire from global leaders.
Thus, this call for stricter rules to govern hedge funds may re-
sult more from a political fear of criticism than from an actual need.
More generally, there seems to be a structural divergence between
what political agendas dictate and what the markets and economic
growth require. Politicians have a strong incentive to adopt populist
measures because they increase their chances of getting reelected in
the short term. Markets and growth, however, require pragmatic and
long term-oriented measures that may not always look appealing from
a political perspective. This is particularly true in the present context,
where electors call for action and for moralization of financial markets.
As John C. Coffee stated, "[h]istorically, bubbles are followed by
crashes, which in turn are followed by punitive legislation."1 so
In the aftermath of the 2007 crisis, hedge funds were no excep-
tion to this statement. President Barack Obama called them "specula-
tors" who were "refusing to sacrifice like everyone else" and who
wanted "to hold out for the prospect of an unjustified taxpayer-funded
bailout."' 1 No hedge fund, however, was ever bailed out. The Presi-
dent's comments were criticized by Congressman Scott Garrett, who
believed the comments revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of
the clients and of the fiduciary responsibilities of hedge fund manag-
ers.18 2 German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nico-
las Sarkozy have also joined forces combating hedge funds.'8 3 Given
the lack of restrictions for retail investors to invest in hedge funds in
Germany, one could understand the Chancellor's concerns, although
hedge funds do nothing except what they are legally allowed to in this
jurisdiction. President Sarkozy, who urged for more regulation in an
already heavily regulated environment, said that one "can't tolerate
hedge funds buying a company with debt, firing a quarter of the staff
180 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashion-
ing Relevant Reforms 46 (Columbia Law School Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 237, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=447940.
181 Steven Mufson & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, In Chrysler Saga, Hedge Funds Cast
As Prime Villain, WASH. POST, May 1, 2009, at A14.
182 Perspectives on Hedge Rund registration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 2-4 (statement of Rep. Scott Garrett,
Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services), available at http://www.house.gov/
apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs dem/111-29.pdf [hereinafter Garrett Testimony].
183 See, e.g., UK Suffers Hedge Fund Blow, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at 1.
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and then enriching themselves by selling it in pieces. We didn't create
the euro to have capitalism without ethics or morals." 184 Particularly
in Europe, there seems to be a sociological pattern to regard hedge
funds as a major threat, symbolizing wild capitalism and greed.
Such passionate and intransigent positions focusing only on
hedge fund as activists could be avoided. The industry, along with po-
litical leaders, must properly educate the public on what hedge funds
do and what their role in the financial crisis really was. As Troy
Paredes noted, "the abuses and collapses that have punctuated the in-
dustry are not indicative of widespread hedge fund behavior.... [T]he
vast number of hedge fund managers are disciplined traders who
make informed, although risky, trades."1 as
In fact, according to the IFSL, hedge funds suffered from the
collapse of banks in the United States. In Europe, hedge funds suf-
fered from the falls in equity markets, from bans on short-selling, and
from pressure to liquidate positions to meet margin and redemptions
calls. 186
Despite these market conditions, hedge funds outperformed
many of the underlying markets, such as the S&P Index, which saw a
38% drop.18 7 The 2009 global return for hedge funds is back to 19%
from -13.9% in 2008.1" Gareth Murphy from the Bank of England
noted, "the sector was free of moral hazard in the sense that the crisis
had not resulted in the public bailout of a single hedge fund."' This
being said, one cannot deny that some of the criticisms and concerns
addressing hedge fund industry are fair, and may, to a certain extent,
justify that some action be taken.
2.2 Systemic Risk
2.2.1 Hedge Funds May Raise Concerns in Terms of Systemic Risk
Hedge funds may be a source of systemic risk and lead to chain
reactions beyond the hedge fund industry, potentially creating a threat
to the entire financial system. Although one often draws a parallel be-
tween the size of the fund and its potential impact in terms of systemic
risk, the "absolute size of an institution is not the predicate for sys-
184 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Sarkozy Turns on "Predator" Hedge Funds, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 1, 2007, at 7.
185 Paredes, supra note 45, at 3.
186 IFSL RESEARCH 2009, supra note 42, at 1.
18 Id.
188 IFSL RESEARCH 2010, supra note 1, at 3-4.
189 EU Commission E.U. Commission Open Hearing on Hedge Funds and Private
Equity Before European Union Commission 11 (2009), available at http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/internal market/investment/docs/conference/summary-en.pdf [hereinaf-
ter E.U. Commission Hearing].
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temic risk; it is rather the size of its debt, its derivatives positions, and
the scope and complexity of many other financial relationships run-
ning between the firm, other institutions, and the wider financial sys-
tem"190 that must be evaluated in order to determine to what extent
the fund poses a systemic risk. Indeed, the failure of LTCM, a hedge
fund worth $4 billion, posed a systemic risk because of its exposure to
banks. On the other hand, the failure of Amaranth, which was worth
more than double that of LTCM ($9.5 billion), had no systemic
impact.191
Most of the risks that arise from hedge fund operations and
strategies are hedge fund-specific, 19 2 such as operational risk, or
fraud. One should be careful not to draw hasty conclusions, as not all
risks are systemic. Indeed, "[ilf, for example, a hedge fund is pursuing
a high risk contrarian strategy, then it is probably lowering systemic
risk." 93
As the Bank of France noted in a study on hedge funds in 2007,
only sophisticated investors are exposed to these types of risk, and
therefore strong regulation is not needed to address them from an in-
vestor protection perspective. However, in its paper on hedge funds,
the European Central Bank noted that hedge funds may affect finan-
cial stability through different channels. 94
The first of these channels is the credit channel, or the reper-
cussions of hedge funds' failures on exposed banks. The LTCM debacle
in 1998 illustrated this channel. A study carried out by the Bank of
France estimates that 17 banks would have collectively lost three to
five billion dollars if LTCM had not been bailed out." Several ele-
ments may explain this hedge fund's failure. These elements include
the use of derivatives, questionable investment decisions, a leverage
190 Implications of the "Volcker Rules" for Financial Stability: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (state-
ment of Hal Scott, Nomura Professor of International Finance Systems at Harvard
Law School), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
files.View&FileStore id=C372f56f-819f-4d93-bb5a-6cl8O2aebl8a [hereinafter
Scott Testimony].
191 Cont, Moussa & Minca, supra note 169.
192 Banque de France, Revue de la Stabilitg Financiare, Numdro Spicial Hedge
Funds, No 10, (April 2007), at 51, available at http://www.banque-france.fr/
archipel/publications/bdf rsflbdf rsf 2007/bdf rsf 10.pdf.
193 CTR. FOR FIN. STUDIES, NEW FINANCIAL ORDER RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE Is-
SING COMMITTEE PREPARING G-20-LONDON 19 (2009).
194 Tomas Garbaravicius & Frank Dierick, Hedge Funds and Their Implications
for Financial Stability (European Cent. Bank, Occasional Paper Series No. 34,
2005), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdVscpops/ecbocp34.pdf.
195 Banque de France, Revue de la Stabilit6 Financibre, Numdro Spicial Hedge
Funds, No 10, (April 2007), at 54.
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ratio of 25, and poor disclosure to its counterparties, which were not
aware of the full size and the riskiness of the portfolio. '9 6 Often expo-
sure and risk come from internal hedge funds, as the $3.2 billion res-
cue of two hedge funds owned by Bear Stearns in 2007 illustrates.1 9 7
In such cases, the fund's failure is likely to have enormous and direct
repercussions on the bank that owns it. Although one can never fully
prevent a fund's failures, Charles River Associates (CRA) notes that
such failures would be less likely to occur today because leverage
levels are quite low and because counterparties have more information
and are capable of assessing the risks.' CRA adds that other hedge
fund failures have had a lesser impact on the markets. Amaranth, for
instance, did not have a destabilizing effect because counterparties to
these funds held sufficient collateral.
Hedge funds may also destabilize the markets through their
transmission and dissemination role. In other words, by reacting to a
bank failure, they may amplify the effects of a crisis and/or spread it.
Although, in this assumption, they are not the source of the problem,
but they may worsen its consequences by reacting to it. In the midst of
the worst crisis of the century, financial stability was not affected by
the hedge fund industry, whose role was limited to transmission
through massive selling of shares and short-selling transactions, as
Jacques de la Laroisibre, Chairman of the High-Level Group on Finan-
cial Supervision in the EU, concluded in his report.1 9 9 The Issing
Committee, in charge of preparing the London G20 meeting, illus-
trated this statement by noting, "hedge funds played a role in crisis
transmission, due to their strong reliance on bank financing and ma-
turity mismatch. In the crisis, these characteristics contributed to pro-
cyclical behavior, in particular to deleveraging and asset sales, which
both had a negative impact on market liquidity."20 0
Systemic risk may also originate from herding behaviors.2 01
The idea is simple and may be illustrated by an example. Imagine
that hedge fund A knows that a stock is overvalued, perhaps due to the
existence of a bubble. The rational decision would be to short these
stocks. However, hedge fund A has a strong interest in achieving tre-
196 Garbaravicius & Dierick, supra note 194, at 29.
197 Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue
Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2007.
198 CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 77-78.
19 JACQUES DE LAROISII:RE, HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 24
(2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/docs/de larosiere
report-en.pdf
201) CTR. FOR FIN. STUDIES, supra note 193, at 5.
201 See David Scharfstein & Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment (Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Sloan School of Mgmt., Working Paper No.
2062-88, 1988).
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mendous returns, especially because its compensation system is
largely based on performance. Shorting a stock that is skyrocketing
would carry the risk to be outperformed by other funds, which would
choose to ride the bubble. Even if hedge fund A knows that the stock is
overvalued, it may ultimately decide to follow the herd to take advan-
tage of the potential returns while the bubble lasts. Being part of the
herd protects the fund from suffering competitive disadvantages. It
also implies that if the bubble bursts, the entire herd will suffer the
same consequences. Based on this example, one can immediately
identify the potential risk posed by these herding behaviors in terms of
procyclicity and legitimately admit that such behaviors may be source
of systemic risk.
Finally, some of the specific hedge fund features may be prob-
lematic for market stability. The first feature is the inherent conflict of
interests posed by valuation. There is indeed a natural incentive to
provide inaccurate, inflated portfolio valuation because the compensa-
tion of hedge fund managers is directly calculated based on this value.
This can lead to distorted assessments by counterparties and clients,
generating risk. Another feature is the redemption system. Hedge
funds are typically structured in a way that does not allow daily liquid-
ity. Rather, hedge funds set up quarterly or annual redemption only,
usually after a lock-up period. This feature limits the impact of ner-
vous and risk-averse behaviors that often amplify the effects of bad
market conditions.
In the current crisis, hedge funds have mainly suffered from
redemptions coming from risk-averse investors who brutally withdrew
their money. This has caused generalized market volatility through
massive selling of shares due notably to redemptions. IFSL estimates
that hedge funds had to return 13.2% of investors' assetS2 02 in 2008,
which had a procyclic effect on the generalized liquidity crisis.
Thus, it seems that some hedge funds, like many other finan-
cial institutions, may be a source of systemic risk important enough to
justify that action be taken to mitigate it. The current approach to
systemic risk is often an ex post "too big to fail"203 bail-out policy. This
can be explained by the fact that regulators experience difficulties in
anticipating the impact of defaults mainly due to a lack of both visibil-
ity and relevant indicators on the structure of the financial system.204
As discussed below, this calls for the development of tools that allow
an ex ante monitoring.
202 IFSL RESEARCH 2009, supra note 42, at 1.
203 See Statement Before the Comm. on Banking of the S. Comm. on Housing and
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Paul A. Volcker) [hereinafter
Volcker Testimony].
204 Cont, Moussa & Minca, supra note 169.
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2.2.2 Mitigating Systemic Risk
Before turning to the question of how systemic risk may be mit-
igated, it is worthwhile to determine whether eliminating systemic
risk is even possible. The answer, I believe, is that although limiting
systemic risk is feasible, it can never be entirely eradicated. Ben
Bernanke similarly noted that trying to do so "would likely stifle inno-
vation without achieving the intended goal." He specified nonetheless
that "authorities should . .. try to ensure that the lapses in risk man-
agement of 1998 do not happen again."205
Andrew Lo wrote that "financial crisis may be an unavoidable
aspect of modern capitalism, a consequence of the interactions be-
tween hardwired human behavior and the unfettered ability to inno-
vate, compete, and evolve. But even if crises cannot be avoided, their
disruptive effects can be reduced significantly."206 This raises the in-
teresting question of the necessary arbitrage between preserving mar-
ket dynamics and mitigating systemic risk. A balance must be struck
between economic efficiency considerations and arguments in favor of
financial stability. Finding the right balance is one of the main chal-
lenges facing legislators. Bearing this challenge in mind, one must
look for ways to improve the current situation in order to limit the
contagion effect and prevent market instability.
As the proverb says, it is difficult to manage what one cannot
measure, and this is particularly true for hedge funds. Indeed, hedge
funds have limited obligations to disclose information that may be re-
garded as important by regulators in order to assess potential systemic
risk. In the puzzle of trying to understand how markets and financial
players are intertwined, hedge funds are often the missing piece.
Indeed, it is hard to deny that hedge funds are relatively
opaque.207 However, the amount and nature of information disclosed
varies depending on whether the disclosure is made to investors,
counterparties, or regulators. While unregulated advisers may not
have to disclose any information to regulators, regulated advisers are
subject to disclosure requirements and may be investigated by regula-
tors at any time.
205 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Atlanta's 2006 Financial Markets Conference (May 16, 2006).
2116 Andrew W. Lo, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008 : Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th
Cong. (2008) (statement of Andrew W. Lo, Professor, MIT Sloan School of Manage-
ment) [hereinafter Lo Testimony].
207 Jean-Pierre Jouyet, President de I'AMF, Intervention a la Conference sur les
Hedge Funds, Bruxelles (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.amf-france.org/
documents/general/8776_1.pdf,.
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The nature and the amount of periodic disclosure due to inves-
tors are mainly defined contractually and remain a private matter be-
tween two parties. If investors deem the amount of information they
receive to be unsatisfactory, they are free not to enter into an agree-
ment with the fund. Because hedge fund investors are qualified and
sophisticated, negotiating contractually the nature of disclosure seems
acceptable. 208
Jean Pierre Jouyet, President of the French Autorit6 des
Marchis Financiers, denounced the opacity with which they carry out
their activities. He argued that this opacity has a cost that is too high
if one looks at the risks inferred by this lack of transparence.2 0 9
This concern has led to the idea of setting an ongoing public
disclosure requirement. As Lo pointed out, "[w]ithout more compre-
hensive data on hedge-fund characteristics such as assets under man-
agement, leverage, counterparty relationships, and portfolio holdings,
it is virtually impossible to draw conclusive inferences about the sys-
temic risks posed by hedge funds."21 0 Although it is difficult to disa-
gree with this statement, public disclosure is not the right answer.
Indeed, as Professor Hal Scott notes, "[a]side from diminishing the
overall value of hedge funds, a public disclosure regime would com-
pletely fail to address systemic risk," since a disclosure regime is pri-
marily meant for investor protection and not for the reduction of
systemic risk.211
Parts II and III further develop the idea that information is
needed to assess systemic risk, and explain that this information
should remain confidential and anonymous, only for use by regulators.
2.3 Investor Protection
The investor protection rationale is less convincing. Hedge
funds are no longer unheard of. Unlike the rationale for bank regula-
tion, which makes sense because it protects all individuals, the ratio-
nale for protecting hedge fund investors is unsatisfactory.2 12
Indeed, only sophisticated investors can enter a partnership
agreement. Because they are sophisticated, they are deemed to be
208 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 46.
209 Jouyet, supra note 207 (author translation of the following: "Soit, mais le coat
de cette opacitg est bien trop bleva, si on le rapporte aux risques induits par ce
difaut de transparence").
210 Lo Testimony, supra note 206, at 3.
211 ScoTT, supra note 169.
212 See, e.g., Kathleen E. Lange, The New Anti-Fraud Rule: Is SEC Enforcement
the Most Effective Way to Protect Investors from Hedge Fund Fraud?, 77 FORD-
HAm L. REv. 851 (2008).
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able to fend for themselves.213 Thus, they cannot claim that they are
unaware of the risk all the more since unregistered hedge funds must
affix a written notice to their documents specifying they are not regis-
tered with the SEC.214 Investors should understand that these types
of investments are risky, and that the risk is the price they pay for the
potential greater returns. They need to understand, as Keynes would
say, "the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay sol-
vent."2 15 One should therefore be careful not to infantilize sophisti-
cated investors by granting too much protection. In Europe, similar
restrictions, both quantitative and qualitative, limit the access to this
type of investment and protect retail investors.2 16
Therefore, as Demirakou writes, there is no reason to believe
that hedge fund investment losses, however painful they are, have a
social cost. 217 As Ben Bernanke noted, "[e]xperienced investors know,
or should know, that in any given year some hedge funds lose money
for their investors and some funds go out of business. Those occur-
rences are only normal and to be expected in a competitive market
economy."218 Congressman Kanjorski also questioned the investor
protection rationale by saying that he "could care less about high-
wealth individuals who want to contribute their money to a group of
investors. If they want to take the shot of losing it, it does not really
affect the rest of society. "219
Shadab also demonstrated,
A general lesson from the law and economics of hedge
funds is that when a legal regime permits financial in-
termediaries to be flexible in their investment strategies
while aligning the incentives of investors and innovators
through performance fees and co-investment by manag-
ers, financial innovation is likely to complement investor
protection without wide-ranging regulation.220
213 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 46.
214 See id.
215 Keynes has been attributed this comment describing his financial losses in
1920. See e.g., ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 123 (2000).
216 See HEDGE FUNDS RE;LATION IN EUROPE, supra note 22, at 6.
217 Maria G. Demirakou, Internal and External Aspects of Hedge Fund Govern-
ance, Harvard Law School, 2008.
218 Bernanke, supra note 206.
219 Perspectives on Hedge Fund Registration: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Comm.
on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. 19 (2009) (statement of Chairman Paul
Kanjorski).
220 Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Inno-
cation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 240, 240 (2009).
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Moreover, it has been argued that the level of due diligence
performed by sophisticated and experienced hedge fund investors
might be significantly more rigorous than any registration regime
would ever require.22 '
SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes goes further by underlining
that the risk of loss incentivizes investors to do the kind of diligence
that will protect their own interests best and that additional SEC over-
sight based on an investor protection rationale is not justified. He
stated:
That well-heeled, sophisticated investors choose to invest
in a hedge fund that provides its investors with little in-
formation should not trigger more SEC oversight.
Neither the complexity of hedge fund strategies nor the
fact that hedge fund investors may lose money because of
a hedge fund fraud or risky hedge fund trade is grounds
for more hedge fund regulation.2 22
The European Central Bank made similar arguments, ques-
tioning the need to regulate in the EU and calling for closer investiga-
tions before considering regulation from an investor protection point of
view.22 3
Two small reservations to the above must be mentioned. The
first is the German legal framework, which does not provide any mini-
mum requirement to invest in a hedge fund and which could poten-
tially raise some investor protection issue.224
The second one is the growing number of investors that could
potentially qualify as accredited investorS225 or its equivalent in other
jurisdictions. 2 2 6 This phenomenon, which is due to inflation according
to Lieder, is referred to as "retailization."227 Some argue that hedge
funds should be made available to retail investors through a fund of
hedge fund, which is the approach followed by the FSA.2 2 8 Indeed, on
February 25, 2010, the FSA released a statement introducing a retail
221 See Garrett Testimony, supra note 182, at 3.
222 See Paredes, supra note 45, at 11.
223 See Garbaravicius & Dierick, supra note 195, at 56.
224 See, e.g., HEDGE FUNDS REGULATION IN EUROPE, supra note 22, at 6.
225 For definition of "accredited investors," see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15).
226 See Jan Lieder, Regulating Hedge Funds: Investor Protection and Systemic
Risk, BUCERIUS L.J., 2009 (observing this growth of potentially qualified
investors).
227 According to Lieder, studies have shown that in 2003, 8.5% of U.S. citizens
could in theory have access to hedge funds. Id. at 94.
228 See e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge
Fund Market for Retail Investors,11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 251, 266 (2008).
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Fund of Alternative Investment Funds.22 9 Although I do not disagree
with such initiatives, one should be extremely careful to guarantee the
appropriate level of investor protection through stricter regulation
whenever retail investors are involved. 23 0 However, for hedge funds
themselves, this paper argues that sophistication is a key factor be-
cause it justifies the light regulatory environment that benefits hedge
funds. Should more and more unsophisticated investors have access to
hedge funds, investor protection could become an issue and therefore
justify more regulation. An alternative solution would be to raise the
standards of the definition of an "accredited investor" in the 1933 Act
and its equivalent in other legal systems. This would limit the range
of investors who could have access to hedge fund interests issued
through a private offering exemption (Rule 506), as in the case of the
United States.
A similar idea is found in the PFIARA, which requires the SEC
to adjust the "qualified client" dollar amount thresholds for inflation
within one year of enactment, and to repeat this process every five
years. 231 The Dodd-Frank Act has a similar provision but focuses on
the "accredited investor" standard. I am a bit doubtful as to using a
quantitative measure of sophistication which does not guarantee that
investors are indeed qualified and able to fend for themselves. Some
qualitative restrictions should also be introduced to complete the ex-
isting framework. For instance, broker dealers could be in charge of
assessing the client's knowledge through detailed questionnaires fol-
lowing the examples of the questionnaire requirement created by the
Mifid Directive in the EU and of the "offering questionnaire" hedge
funds often use to assess the level of sophistication in the United
States.232
The call for more disclosure is also said to be for investors'
sake. According to the SEC staff report, hedge funds "generally are
not required to meet prescribed disclosure requirements."2 33 How-
ever, a hedge fund is compelled to make a comprehensive disclosure to
potential investors, both to satisfy fiduciary obligations under the IAA
and state laws and to comply with antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties laws2 34 and the requirements of the private offering exemption. 23 5
229 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., -POLICY STATEMENT 10/3: FUNDS OF ALTERNATIVE INVEST-
MENT FUNDs (FAIFs) (2010).
230 I shall not analyze in greater details the possibility of allowing retail investors
to access these complex investment vehicles, as funds of hedge funds are out of the
scope of this paper.
231 PFIARA § 418.
232 Council Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004 O.J. (L145/1) 30 (EC).
233 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at ix.
234 Since 2007, all investment advisers are prohibited from "mak[ing]any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary to
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Moreover, as sophisticated investors become more aware of
how hedge funds work, they tend to require extensive disclosure from
managers. Unlike the purchase of publicly traded securities, owner-
ship in a hedge fund comes from a contractual agreement, which may
potentially be negotiated. This has a direct impact on the amount of
information hedge funds disclose in their offering and private place-
ment memoranda (PPM).2 3" PPM are not mandatory under Rule 506,
but result from market practice and from the need of hedge fund man-
agers to protect themselves from liability under antifraud provi-
sions."3 Moreover, practice has shown that hedge funds have to
disclose more and more information to more and more exigent inves-
tors without the need for formal disclosure requirements.2
Therefore, the investor protection argument seems questiona-
ble and does not justify additional regulation. Systemic risk, however,
appears to be a legitimate source of concerns, although several doubts
can be raised as to the capacity of regulation to address it in a fully
satisfactory manner. Part II provides an analytical and critical over-
view of proposals of the U.S. Congress and the European Commission.
PART II: THE FUTURE OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE PRIVATE FUND
INVESTMENT ADVISERS REGISTRATION ACT OF
2009 AND OF THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT
FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE
As we discuss current proposals in the United States and in the
EU to reform the legal regimes applicable to hedge funds, one must
bear in mind that current regimes are different from one another.
Since, the United States and the EU agree on the need to regulate
hedge funds, it would seem like the perfect time to harmonize the vari-
ous legal regimes and to set up global rules. This section examines
both the European and American proposals and determines whether
efforts in that direction are being made.
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled
investment vehicle."17 C.F.R. § 2 7 5.2 06(4)-8(a)(1) (2009).
235 SHARTsIs FRIESE LLP, supra note 46, at 4.
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1. The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009
1.1 Provisions of the Act
The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of
2009 aims at regulating hedge fund advisers, not hedge funds them-
selves. It provides first and foremost a definition of "private fund" as
an investment fund that relies on an ICA exemption, either 3(c)(1) or
3(c)(7). 2 39 The Act eliminates the private adviser exemption relying on
Rule §203(b)(3) of the IAA and requires most hedge fund advisers
above a $30 million threshold of assets under management to register
with the SEC as investment advisers.2 4 0
In other words, hedge funds will no longer be able to rely on the
15 client exemption under the IAA and will have to be registered. The
Act also empowers the SEC as a risk assessment authority, which
could potentially establish new requirements if it deems it necessary,
including regulating funds themselves based on their size, governance,
and investment strategies.
The SEC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve, would es-
tablish the records and files keeping requirement. Hedge fund advis-
ers would be required to keep information regarding the assets they
manage, their use of leverage, and their counterparty credit risk.
These records could be subject to examination at any moment. Indeed
the PFIARA imposes stricter reporting and disclosure requirements
that will affect the entire industry, including advisers already regis-
tered with the SEC. 24 1 The PFIARA provides that disclosing non-pub-
lic sensitive information would not be required and that all other
information would be kept confidential. 2 4 2 However, in reading be-
tween the lines, one quickly realizes that hedge funds could in fact be
asked to reveal their trading practices and positions as well as any
other information that the SEC or Fed deemed necessary to protect
investors and assess systemic risk. This information would also be
239 PFIARA § 402.
240 Id. The PFIARA created an exemption from the registration requirement for
an adviser if this latter acts solely as an adviser to private funds and has less than
$150 million under management. These managers will not be exempt from the
providing the SEC with an annual report and any document that the SEC will
deem necessary. The "Dodd bill" contains a similar exemption for adviser with less
than $100 million of assets under management. Between $25 million and $100
million, the adviser would need to register with state regulators. This diverges
from the House approach under which these advisers would remain subject to fed-
eral regulation but would be exempt from the registration requirements.
241 Id., § 404.
242 Id.
2011] THE FUTURE OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION
shared with any other entity aiming to control systemic risk, including
the newly established Financial Stability Oversight Council.":'
As explained further in Part III, this forced disclosure may be
extremely problematic because hedge funds distinguish themselves
from one another by their setting their own strategies. They create
value using their unique models. Publicly disclosing this type of infor-
mation would harm both hedge funds and their clients. It will be very
interesting to see how the Senate will approach the disclosure require-
ments and whether it will require public disclosure or keep the confi-
dential reporting adopted by the House. The Dodd-Frank Bill seems to
follow the PFIARA's path and provides that "proprietary information"
such as trading data or strategies should not be made publicly availa-
ble. However both versions allow this information to be shared with
courts, agencies or federal departments which still raises questions in
terms of confidentiality and protection of business strategies.
In this regard, this paper supports the recommendation made
by the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR) to create a
confidential reporting requirement, provided that the information col-
lected remain confidential and is not accessible by other hedge
funds.24 4 Rather, the regulator should only use the data to assess po-
tential threats to financial stability, and should only take action if it is
needed to prevent failures and chain reactions. This information
should also remain anonymous in order to avoid information leakage.
The CCMR Report suggests that information about the fund's liquidity
needs, leverage use, risk concentrations, and connectedness, should be
disclosed to others.2 4 5 It further suggests, and I completely share this
analysis, that "the regulator would bear the burden of demonstrating
its need for the required information as well as its ability to use that
information effectively." 24 6
The PFIARA has been well received by the industry, as most of
hedge funds have already registered voluntarily with the SEC. Todd
Groome, Chairman of the Alternative Investment Management Asso-
ciation (AIMA) declared that the AIMA supported the registration of
managers. Richard Baker of the Managed Funds Association
(MFA)acknowledged that the mandatory registration of investment
advisers was "the right approach" although not a "panacea," in partic-
ular because of the costs registration will entail.247
243 Id.
244 COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN
FOR REGULATORY REFORM 13 (2009).
245 id.
246 Id.
247 Perspectives on Hedge Fund Registration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Comm.
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Additionally, shortly after the adoption of the Hedge Fund
Rule, Chris Kentouris wrote that "the SEC's initial estimate of $50,000
a year" in compliance costs "was quickly debunked."24 8 Kentouris fur-
ther stated that "there is just too much to do and too few who know
how to do it, with some citing a figure of at least double that
amount."249
The approach chosen by the SEC resembles the U.K's ap-
proach, which also requires that advisers be registered with the FSA.
This is a significant and encouraging step toward greater harmoniza-
tion of the legal regimes of the two main platforms for hedge fund
managers in the United States and the United Kingdom.2 50
1.2 Assessing the PFIARA
To assess the utility and the potential effectiveness of this pro-
posal, two questions come to mind. First, does the PFIARA provide a
real improvement and is likely to generate substantial changes in the
hedge funds' course of business? Second, does it effectively address the
issue of systemic risk?
Registration
First of all, was the PFIARA really necessary? The main provi-
sion is the mandatory registration of all investment advisers who man-
age more than $30 million of assets.2 5 1 Many within the industry have
expressed doubts as to what registration would really accomplish for
investors, for hedge fund managers, and for the markets.2 52 I tend to
believe that registration is beneficial because it provides the SEC with
the opportunity to exercise its oversight on the activities of hedge
funds themselves through the oversight on hedge fund advisers. How-
ever, Congress's attempt to make this registration mandatory is
puzzling.
From a hedge fund manager's point of view, there is a natural
incentive to register because it gives them a competitive edge. It is
on Financial Servs., 11th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Richard Baker, Managed
Funds Assoc.) [hereinafter Baker Testimony].
248 Chris Kentouris, The Cost to Comply, SECURITIES INDUSTRY Nvws, Dec. 6,
2004.
249 Id.
250 Hedge funds themselves are not U.K.-based because of an unfavorable tax re-
gime that deters from incorporation in the UK.
251 PFIARA, § 402. Advisers managing less than $25 million in assets under man-
agement are prohibited from registering with the SEC and are subject to state
law.
252 Eric Jackson, The Good, the Bad and Ugly in Hedge Funds: A Manager's View,
Bus. WK., Mar. 5, 2009.
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particularly true in this economy that when an investor is faced with a
choice between a registered fund and an unregistered one, the investor
will naturally favor the one that is registered. Some even declared
that registration for registration's sake seems like a waste of time be-
cause a growing number of hedge funds, (70%'X according to the Man-
aged Funds Association, representing a majority of assets) have
voluntarily registered and already provide a list of holdings on a quar-
terly basis."" The MFA further argues that having hedge funds regis-
ter was no guarantee that no incident would ever occur."'
After all, the current crisis was caused by regulated invest-
ment banks, and one of the biggest frauds of the century was commit-
ted by Madoff, an SEC-registered broker-dealer. Raising this
particular issue, Juraj, in quite a humoristic way, questioned the effec-
tiveness of regulation. He quoted one sentence from George Soros, "I
am having a good crisis,"255 and then the word "guilty,"2 5 6 which was
declared by Bernard Madoff at his trial. He then explained that the
main difference between these two men was that Madoff was subject to
the SEC's oversight, whereas Soros was not.2 5 7
Finally, Groome expressed concerns as to the implications of
the PFIARA for non-U.S. managers who could face dual registration.
He therefore called for a full exemption for non-U.S. managers who are
already registered in an OECD country or others where domestic regu-
lators cooperate and share information with the SEC.2 58
This concern, although legitimate, is addressed in the PFIARA.
If not modified by the Senate, the PFIARA would include a foreign
private advisers exemption. Provided that (1) the adviser does not
have her place of business in the United States' (2) has had 15 or fewer
clients in the preceding year; (3) has less than $25 million of assets
under management; and (4) does not hold herself out to the public or
advises a registered investment company, she would not need to regis-
ter with the SEC.2 5 9 The exemption seems a bit artificial because of
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 "I'm Having a Very Good Crisis," Says Soros as Hedge Fund Managers Make
Billions off Recession, DAILY MAIL, Mar. 25, 2009.
256 Diana B. Henriques & Jack Healy, Madoff Goes to Jail After Guilty Pleas, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009.
257 Alexander Juraj, New Governance and Hedge Fund Regulation: Shorting Fed-
eralism or Bernie's Nightmare? HEDGE FUND REGULATION 2 (2009). For a similar
argument see also Garrett Testimony, supra note 182, at 3.
258 AIMA, AIMA Reiterates Support for Registration of Hedge Fund Managers in
the U.S., http://www.aima.org/en/media-centre/press-releases.cfm/id/40F01E5D-
3FO4-4184-9B4EO87C8FF502CD.
259 PFIARA, § 402. The SEC would have the authority to set a higher threshold if
it deems it appropriate based on a investors' protection rationale.
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the low $25 million threshold. As a result, this exemption will be lim-
ited to a few investment advisers whose involvement with U.S inves-
tors is low.
Transparency
Another concern is transparency. As previously discussed,
hedge funds are often criticized for their opacity. However, stricter
disclosure requirements to investors may not be needed. Managers,
whether registered or not, have fiduciary duties, are subject to anti-
fraud provisions, and must fulfill the requirements of private offerings
under §4(2) of the Securities Act. They must make true, accurate, and
comprehensive disclosures in their PPMs, their Partnership Agree-
ments, and their Subscription Agreements, which typically contain the
kind of information that would be required in a registration state-
ment.260 Moreover, as investors become more and more comfortable
with hedge funds and their practices, their disclosure expectations
grow, which leads managers to disclose more information on the risks
they take, on their compensation arrangements, or on the type of strat-
egies used.
However, it is difficult in practice to grasp the risks that are
taken. Often, to shield the manager and the fund from liability, PPM
provides a list of the types of potential risks without being too specific,
which fails to give an accurate picture of the risks at stake.
As far as the investor protection rationale is concerned, some
argue that because pension and mutual funds invest in hedge funds,
additional protections should be created. However, such protections
already exist. Mutual funds are subject to diversification require-
ments under the Investment Company Act. Additionally, both pension
funds' and mutual funds' interests in a hedge fund cannot exceed 30%.
The second concern is the disclosure to counterparties. I do not
believe that regulations need to be passed in order for broker-dealers
or banks to assess risks. These counterparties have the expertise and
the tools to carry out their due diligence, and they remain free not to
enter into agreement if they determine that the level of disclosure is
not satisfactory. Therefore, the opacity between hedge funds and
counterparties can be resolved by contractual agreements between
parties without any regulatory intervention.
Leverage
Regulation T already indirectly limits the amount of leverage
hedge fund can undertake."' Indeed, Regulation T regulates the ex-
260 Shadab, supra note 220, at 286.
261 12 CFR § 220.12 (1998).
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tension of credit provided by broker-dealers and imposes a 50% cap for
securities bought on margin.26 This means that hedge funds may be
required at any time to satisfy margin calls and to deposit additional
money or stocks to meet these requirements. This indirectly limits
hedge funds' use of leverage as margin calls may occur at any time,
especially when markets depreciate.
However, Jonna points out that broker-dealers typically ar-
range financing through foreign affiliates that are not registered with
the SEC. 2 6 3 Leverage can be a real issue in terms of systemic risk.
However, it seems that the industry spontaneously limits its leverage
use. The chairman of the FSA recently said that the average leverage
of hedge funds was two or three to one, which Congressman Edward
Royce called a "staggeringly low amount of leverage if you consider
that our most heavily regulated institutions like the Government
Sponsored Enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were leveraged
here in the United States by 100 to 1."264 The exhibit below, provided
by the Charles River Associates Report, on the impact of the AIFM
Directive, illustrates this relatively low use of leverage on a global
level. The report explains that the amount of leverage depends on the
strategies carried out by hedge funds, and varies accordingly. For in-
stance, arbitrage funds are more leveraged than distressed securities-
based investments.2 6 5
The Fed also acknowledged that overall, the industry showed a
lack of leverage. This explains why the losses hedge funds suffered did
not threaten the stability of the financial system. Richard Baker, CEO
of the Managed Funds Association, reported that a recent study found
that 26.9% of hedge funds used zero leverage.2 6 6
The main reason explaining this relative lack of leverage is the
fear of its disappearance. Leveraged funds run the risk of being wiped
out. Indeed, hedge funds often invest in products that are already in-
trinsically leveraged and prone to illiquidity, such as junk bonds.
Moreover, because of redemption rights, investors may withdraw their
money at any time, creating a potential danger for the fund if it is
over-leveraged. As a result, there is a strong natural incentive for
hedge fund managers to be spontaneously cautious about leverage.
This incentive may be more effective at preventing irresponsible be-
262 Id.
263 Paul M. Jonna, In Search of Market Discipline: The Case for Indirect Hedge
Fund Regulation, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 989, 1026 (2008).
264 Perspectives on Hedge Fund Registration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. 1, 7 (2009) (statement of Edward Royce).
265 CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 23.
266 Baker Testimony, supra note 247, at 11.
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haviors than formal rules. The market acts as the best arbitrator be-
tween well-managed and poorly-managed funds and operates as
natural selection. Well-managed, low-leveraged funds are less likely to
disappear, incentivizing hedge fund managers to follow this type of
"best practice."
Risk
Although one should not over-generalize, the risks managers
take may not be as dangerous as they appear, especially if one takes
into account the fact that most hedge funds have so-called "high water
mark" provisions. Under these provisions, the manager only receives
performance fees when the assets' value is greater than its previous
greatest value. 26 7 Studies have shown that funds with high water
marks perform better than those without high water marks.2 68 Ac-
cording to Shadab, this demonstrates that managers react positively to
this incentive.2 69
267 See Shadab, supra note 220, at 277-78.
268 Id. at 278.
269 Id. at 278.
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Role of the SEC
One may question the relevance of the PFIARA. Indeed, one
should be extremely careful when trying to prevent these vehicles from
being overly aggressive, but rather pushing them to favor flexibility.
This does not mean that hedge funds should be allowed to engage in
any type of fraud or any other risky activity that would pose a real
threat to the financial system. This simply means that the current
legal framework does not need to be changed. Preventing reckless be-
haviors and enforcing current rules may be achieved by reinforcing the
powers of the SEC. In this regard, the recent trends and evolutions
within the SEC must be applauded. Indeed, the SEC recently estab-
lished five new units within its enforcement division, including one for
hedge funds and private equity firms, which the SEC regarded as one
of its priority areas.2 70
The newly appointed SEC's N.Y. Chief George Canellos also
confirmed that hedge funds were a big area of emphasis and that the
SEC conducted a number of significant sweeps of investment advisers
in the last year or two. He further explained that they moved towards
cause and risk-based exams rather than more routine checks. 27 1 Fi-
nally, there seems to be a trend to include more industry participants
within the SEC's staff, which is an interesting and encouraging evolu-
tion that could lead to a better understanding and control over hedge
fund activities.
Based on the above, it is unclear what the additional regulation
could bring that market discipline and better-tailored SEC oversight
could not achieve on its own. If the sole purpose of the PFIARA is to
make registration mandatory, the impact will be marginal compared
to the time and costs this reform will generate. It seems that the
PFIARA fails to provide a sufficient benefit in terms of systemic risk
reduction compared to its potential costs.
The Obama /Volcker Proposal
The PFIARA is not the only proposal that would have an im-
pact on the hedge fund world. More problematic and potentially harm-
ful is the so-called Obama Proposal272 introduced on January 21, 2010,
which would bar bank holding companies from owning or investing in
hedge funds and private equity funds. The rationale behind this pro-
270 New SEC Unit To Cover Hedge Fund, P.E. Probes, FINALTERNATIVEs, Jan. 14,
2010, http://www.finalternatives.com/node/10232.
271 SEC'S New N.Y. Chief Turns Spotlight On Hedge Funds, FINALTERNATIVES
Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.finalternatives.com/node/10105.
272 Volcker Testimony, supra note 201, at 2. This proposal was first introduced by
former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker before Senate on February 2,
2010.
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posal is to reduce systemic risk by limiting the interconnectedness of
financial institutions. Yet, it is not clear that the rule would really
have the effect it predicts. According to Professor Scott, the Volcker
Rules are both "over-inclusive because not all banks, and not even all
large banks, pose chain-reaction risks to the financial system" and
"also potentially under-inclusive, because many interconnected finan-
cial institutions which do pose systemic risks are not deposit-taking
banks."2 73
Besides potentially failing to address the systemic risk issue,
the proposal would harm the hedge fund industry. There are also con-
cerns about the "possibility of liquidity in markets being reduced and
the prime broker relationship being adversely affected."274 This situa-
tion is even more preoccupying because the U.K. has explicitly ruled
out such a proposal, and because the EU is not likely to adopt such
provisions. One can easily imagine what the lack of coordination
might do to the U.S. hedge fund industry should this proposal be
adopted.
2. The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
2.1 Provisions of the Directive
In April 2009, the European Commission released a draft of the
Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive (AIFM) aiming at
the goal of regulating the non-UCITS fund managers who have more
than C100 million of assets under management. There are two ex-
emptions in this provision.
First, fund managers whose assets under management consist
of less than C500 million, whose portfolios are unleveraged, and whose
funds offer no redemption rights during five years may be out of the
scope of this Directive. So would an alternative investment manager
who wouldn't manage an EU-domiciled hedge fund and who wouldn't
market in the European Union.
The AIFM Directive would require all alternative investment
fund managers to be authorized in the member state in which its regis-
tered office is located and subject to harmonized regulatory standards
on an ongoing basis. By alternative investment fund (AIF), the Com-
mission means "any collective investment undertaking, including in-
vestment compartments thereof whose object is the collective
investment in assets and which does not require authorization" under
the UCITS Directive. 275 This definition is extremely broad and gener-
2731 Scott Testimony, supra note 190, at 5.
274 Obarna Proposal Would Block Banks From Hedge Funds, Private Equity,
FINALTERNATIVEIS, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11031.
275 Proposal for Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alter-
native Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2004/39/EC and
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ally includes hedge funds. Once authorized, fund managers may mar-
ket anywhere throughout the European Union, thus benefititng from
the European passport, which would significantly reduce their
costs.2 7"
Articles 19 through 21 impose transparency requirements re-
lating to the funds,2 77 such as the need to provide an audited annual
report and to disclose information to investors and regulators about
the fund's investment strategy, the identity of depositary, the valua-
tion procedure, and how liquidity risk is managed. 278 According to
CRA's impact report, the rationale behind this requirement is that
"[dlisclosure to investors is expected to reduce asymmetric information
and increase investor confidence about investing in the fund," and
"[d]isclosure to competent authorities is expected to bring about im-
proved regulatory oversight of AIF including with respect to systemic
risk."2 79
Funds domiciled outside of the EU ("third country funds")
would also gain access to the European market provided they meet EU
regulatory and supervisory requirements after a transitional period of
three to five years.280 In other words, third country funds could be
marketed in the EU if their legislations are equivalent to the provi-
sions of the Directive, if there were reciprocal market access, and if
they complied with the OECD Model Tax Convention standards.2 8 1
The provision relating to third country funds has raised criticism, al-
beit only 5.8% of global hedge funds are domiciled in the EU, mainly in
Ireland, Luxembourg, and France.2 82
Finally, the AIFM Directive would further impose minimum
capital requirements,2 8 3 as well as conflicts of interest, risk and liquid-managment184ity management requirements, an independent valuation of as-
sets,28 5 threshold disclosure, 2 86 and would limit the fund's use of
leverage.
2009/.. ./EC, 31-33 COM (2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009) [hereinafter AIFM Direc-
tive]. Please note that AIFM Directive refers to the draft as of April 2010. The
final version is discussed in the Recent Developments section.
276 AIFM Directive, art. 32; CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 46.
277 AIFM Directive, arts. 19-21.
278 Id.
279 CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 36-37.280 AIFM Directive, art. 3.5.8.
281 For further explanation, see CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 38.
282 Id. at 18, 58.
283 AIFM Directive, art. 14.
284 Id., arts 10-12 and 16.
285 Id., arts. 10-12 and 16.
286 Id., arts. 26-27; CHARLEs RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 37. Hedge funds
would be required to disclose their positions when they reach 30% of voting rights.
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2.2 Assessing the AIFM Directive
On February 1st, 2010, the Spanish government, which cur-
rently holds the rotating presidency of the Union, published the third
draft of the AIFM. 287 These proposed rules have been heavily criti-
cized, particularly by the Bank of England, the Financial Services Au-
thority and the House of Lords. The House of Lords recently warned
that the rules could have disastrous consequences for the European
economy and could "sap European competitiveness."2 88 On March 16,
2010, Spain announced that the vote of the Union's finance ministers
on the AIFM Directive would be postponed to the beginning of the
summer, provoking strong reactions among members of the European
Union Parliament and from some member states, such as Germany.289
Several provisions of the AIFM draft are problematic. The best
illustration of the controversial nature of the European Commission
language is the number of proposed amendments by members of Euro-
pean parliament and the Alternative Investment Management Associ-
ation (AIMA), more than 1000 so far 290 and 80 introduced by the
AIMA,29 as well as the arguments the proposed rules have raised
among member states and even within the European institutions.
Leverage
The same reasoning developed in the assessment of the
PFIARA applies to the leverage requirements that the Directive would
develop and impose on hedge funds. It seems like there is a natural
incentive to limit leverage in order to avoid potential failures. Moreo-
ver, as the CRA impact study demonstrates, "it unclear that the
AIFMD will be effective in preventing the transmission of systemic
risk associated with leverage."2 9 2 Additionally, leverage limits "could
add to procyclicity at a time of crisis by forcing hedge funds to sell to
stay within the prescribed regulatory limit. In addition, investors
287 The previous directive was introduced by the Swedish Presidency of the E.U.
and was abandoned largely because of the criticism raised by the U.K.
288 British Lords Join In Savaging Proposed European Hedge Fund Rules, FINAL-
TERNATIVES, (Feb. 10, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/
11360.
289 British Block European Hedge Fund Rules, FINALTERNATIVES, Mar. 16, 2010,
http://www.finalternatives.com/node/1 1781.
290 Avalanche of Amendments Inundate EU Hedge Fund Rules, FINALTERNATIV\ES,
Jan. 28, 2010, http: //www.finalternatives.com/node/11098/.
291 Tony Griffiths, Aima Releases its List of Amendments to Directive, HFMWEEK,
(Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.hfmweek.con/news/427003/aima-releases-its-list-of-
amendments-to-directive.thtml.
292 CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 4-5.
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would no longer have access to particular strategies with high lever-
age, further reducing choice and returns."29 3
Finally, it should be noted that specific rules on leverage would
be adopted through implementing measures after the Directive comes
into force. This additional factor creates uncertainty and makes lever-
age limitations provisions difticult to assess at the current stage of the
legislative process.
Third Country
The main criticism targets the provision applicable to foreign
funds. Under the current draft, foreign funds would not be allowed to
market in the EU unless they meet EU standards-which that are
stricter than most of their home jurisdictions-and only if cooperation
arrangements are in place between the regulator of the manager's ju-
risdiction and that of the EU member state in which investors are lo-
cated.2 9 4 This proposal would bar funds whose home jurisdiction rules
are not as strict as that of the European Union, which, according to the
head of FSA's asset management division, represents 40% of the
world's hedge funds.295
In addition, the third country provision creates a blurry frame-
work and is a source of legal uncertainty. CRA's report points out that
the current draft of the Directive "indicates that the EC will determine
whether or not third countries are considered to have equivalent regu-
lation to that in the Directive. This decision will occur after the adop-
tion of the Directive and therefore, at present, no non-EU country can
be assumed to have met the equivalence test."2 9 6
Under such circumstances, the U.K.'s House of Lords has
urged the British government to veto the proposed rules, unless it is
made "compatible with equivalent legislation with regulatory regimes
in third countries and in particular in the United States."297 The
HFSB also issued a statement expressing its concerns.
The draft directive has not been discussed with the key
interested parties nor is it consistent with the analysis
and recommendations of the Commission's own experts
as outlined in the well received De Larosibre Report. The
Directive also ignores the efforts already underway to de-
velop global proposals such as those taking place under
293 Id. at 4.
294 Id. at 38.
295 Avalanche of Amendments Inundate EU Hedge Fund Rules, FINALTERNATIVES,
Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11098/.
296 CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 40.
297 British Lords Join In Savaging Proposed European Hedge Fund Rules, FINAL-
TERNATIVES, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11360.
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the G20 process. We are particularly concerned that the
draft Directive opts for prescriptive norms, in contrast
with the principles-based approach under which the in-
dustry developed in the U.K. It would empower the Com-
mission to issue detailed regulations, in effect sidelining
national regulators. It would also force non-E.U. coun-
tries to approve equivalent regulation if they want to
maintain access to the European market.2 98
Jacques de Larosibre himself acknowledged in a conference in
June 2009, "the directive went much further than his report
recommended."2 99
Finally, the United States Secretary of Treasury expressed his
concerns in a letter addressed to EU Commissioner for Internal Mar-
ket and Services Michel Barnier.30 0 Geithner asserts that the "U.S-
E.U. relationship is absolutely vital for achieving effective regulation
of financial markets" and that both markets should "fulfill our G-20
commitment to avoid discrimination and maintain a level playing
field."ao1 He further explained that the United States is worried about
"various proposals that would discriminate against U.S. firms and
deny them the access to the E.U. market."30 2 It is unclear whether the
United States would fail the equivalence test since the criteria are not
yet defined, although the differences in tax regimes could very well
become an issue. Indeed, the concerns expressed by third countries,
such as the United States, are mainly derived from the lack of cer-
tainty regarding the criteria that would be used to determine whether
a country's regulatory framework is equivalent, since these criteria are
believed to potentially bar non-EU hedge funds from the European
market.
The draft also gave rise to much criticism within the hedge
fund industry, particularly afraid that the Directive would put the
hedge funds out of business in the EU. Hedge fund lawyers also ex-
pressed concerns about the potential outcome of such draconian mea-
sures and warned that should the Directive come into force, one would
witness a hedge fund exodus. Soon, no hedge fund would operate from
298 Hedge Fund Standards Board, Statement on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers Directive (Apr. 29, 2009).299 Alternative Investment Management Association, AIMA Welcomes de
Larosiere, Turner, Myners, Sassoon Comments on Draft Directive (June 24, 2009),
available at http://www.aima.org/en/media-centre/press-releases.cfm/lid/9E633F
0A-915B-474E-8C3BBA83090E6466.
3oo Letter from Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Sec'y, to Michel Barnier, Euro-
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within the EU, since hedge funds are much more mobile than banks
and would have no trouble relocating in more friendly.jurisdictions.0 o
Potential Impact on Investors
In the end, EU-based investors may suffer as well. European
institutional investors are currently free to seek out the best managers
globally, but it seems that this freedom will soon cease to exist. Indeed,
the quantity and variety of funds available would diminish a great
deal, because investors will not have access to funds managed by a
non-registered manager.
Article 3(d) of the AIFM Directive defines marketing as "any
general offering or placement of units or shares in an AIF to or with
investors domiciled in the Community, 304 regardless of at whose initi-
ative the offer or placement takes place." Marketing would be prohib-
ited for funds that do not comply with the Directive's provisions. This
is a different approach to that taken in the UCITS Directive, which
allows investors to purchase securities that are not marketed in the
EU.aos Since many funds will be unable to comply with the AIFM Di-
rective requirements and will not be allowed to market in the EU, in-
vestors will lose investment opportunities evaluated as a reduction in
the annual returns to EU investors of around C 1.4 billion. 0 6 As An-
drew Baker from the AIMA explains, "[a]ny restrictions imposed on
European investors would also hit asset managers in financial centers
such as the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, Japan, Australia and South Africa."sor
This paper supports the position taken by the U.K. and by the
industry itself. The Directive does not benefit European member
states' legal environments and may harm the industry. Its vagueness
on disclosure issues and capital requirements, for instance, would
make it either dangerous or ineffective. Moreover, the third country
provision would be a disaster for hedge funds and for investors. Al-
though some argue that the EU does not want to discriminate against
EU managers and, "it is a matter of level playing field,"os the markets
303 All Hedge Funds Will Leave European Union, Lawyer Warns, FINALTERNA-
TIVEs, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.finalternatives.com/node/9962.
304 AIFM Directive, art. 3(e). Note that checking each investor's domiciliation
could be challenging from a practical point of view as well as costly.
305 Council Directive 2009/65, 2009 O.J. (L 302/32) (EC).
306 CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 62.
307 Spain Re-introduces "Protectionist" Measure to European AIFM Directive, AL-
TASSETS, Feb. 18, 2010, http://www.altassets.com/private-equity-news/article/nz1
7956.html.
308 Foreign Funds Take Center Stage In EU Hedge Fund Debate, FINALTERNA-
TIVES, Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11338 (citing Becher).
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should not be regarded only at the European level, but rather on a
global scale.
Therefore, this paper concludes that the AIFM draft is inade-
quate at best because it fails to improve the current system and re-
mains vague, if not dangerous and protectionist.
PART III: HOW TO REGULATE HEDGE FUNDS: SEVERAL
ELEMENTS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
BEFORE CONSIDERING IMPOSING MORE
REGULATION ON HEDGE FUNDS.
The debate of whether or not to regulate one player of the fi-
nancial system is crucial, and requires a legal and economic analysis of
financial regulation. Part III of this paper offers general remarks on
financial regulation and how these comments apply to the hedge fund
situation. Additionally, in following a cost/benefit approach, I con-
clude that the current regulatory trends are misdirected and fail to
propose a better alternative to present legal regimes. Finally, Part III
advocates for the creation of a global database of financial information
that will allow regulators to monitor systemic risk without impairing
hedge funds' activities and performances and discusses the challenge
of developing global standards.
1. General Remarks on Hedge Fund Regulation: Factors to Take
Into Account When Considering More Regulation
1.1 Questions to Be Asked and Remarks to Be Made Before
Considering Changes in Legal Frameworks Applicable to Hedge
Funds
Know What You Want to Regulate
When trying to regulate hedge funds, addressing the subject of
the regulation itself is a major challenge. Indeed, regulating hedge
funds as a homogeneous entity may turn out to be a "fruitless exercise"
because hedge funds are heterogeneous to the point that they are "the
entire investment world less the small subset of traditional invest-
ment strategies," from arbitrage to event driven or macro strate-
gies."" According to Bookstaber, "with so broad a classification,
seeking a uniform approach would be like developing a single set of
traffic rules to apply for all modes of transportation, from pedestrians
to commercial jets.":"" Juraj makes a similar point, stating that there
is no single regulatory framework that can be imposed on all hedge
09 RI(lARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DEsItN: MARKETS, HEDGE
FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 244, 247 (2007).
:o10 Id. at 248.
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funds because the variety of fund structure, strategies, and their social
positions require a varied approach.:"
Though this is true, a distinction has to be made between regu-
lation as it is often regarded and the hybrid rules-based approach and
a principles-based approach of regulation. Trying to regulate such a
heterogeneous group with stringent rules may be challenging, impossi-
ble, and even dangerous. A principles-based regulation like the Brit-
ish Financial Services Authority's or the Dubai Financial Services
Authority's (DFSA)si 2 provides a general framework that the industry
must follow and adapt to its own business. This approach is more flex-
ible, thus making regulation better suited to the industry's needs and
more likely to be properly enforced by hedge funds. This statement is
illustrated by the forewords of the DFSA in its Hedge Fund Code of
Practice:
Instead of rules, we have adopted a principles based ap-
proach for developing best practice standards. We be-
lieve this will promote certainty while allowing industry
participants a degree of flexibility to adapt these stan-
dards to suit their particular businesses in light of
changing market conditions and emerging issues.3 1 3
The heterogeneity argument can also be applied to the size of
these investment vehicles. It is quite intuitive to say that smaller
funds are less likely to pose a systemic risk problem and thus need less
314supervision.
In the United States, for instance, 213 hedge funds are in the
so-called "billion dollar club" and hold more than $1 billion of assets
under management, while only 34 manage more than $10 billion. 15
311 Juraj, supra note 257, at 24.
312 In Dubai, hedge funds are required to comply with the Collective Investment
Law. Collective Investment Law, DIFC Law No. 1 of 2006, available at http://
www.complinet.com/file-store/pdf/rulebooks/DFSA-8387.pdf. This law was en-
acted and came into force on 18 April 2006 and was amended in 2006 and 2007.
These rules are broad and do not apply to hedge funds directly. Therefore, the
DFSA has chosen to follow a U.K-like approach. In 2007, a non-biding Hedge Fund
Code of Practice was launched. It aims at addressing issues and risks that are
specific to hedge funds. Dubai Financial Services Authority, Hedge Fund Code of
Practice, 2007.
313 Dubai Financial Services Authority, Hedge Fund Code of Practice, 2007 at 2.
314 Perspectives on Hedge Fund Registration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. On Financial Servs., 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Brad Sherman,
Congressman) (stating that small entities should not have to bear excessive regu-
lation in order to preserve "cowboy capitalism").
315 Hedge Fund Intelligence, Global Review 2010 Report, 2010 available at http://
www.hedgefundintelligence.com/Article/2455359/Issue/74948/Global-hedge-fund-
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This is a modest number compared to the 9400 hedge funds that exist
worldwide. This also means that the majority of funds are probably
too small to raise concerns of systemic risk. In that respect, it should
be noted and appreciated that both the PFIARA and the AIFM address
this concern by exempting small funds from registration, therefore
providing them a way out of complying and supporting the costs that
registration and on-going disclosure would entail. Under the PFIARA,
funds with less than $30 million of assets under management are ex-
empted from registration."' The AIFM Directive does not require re-
gistration for funds under C 100 million of managed portfolio. Should
the Directive be adopted, 90% of assets of EU domiciled hedge funds
would fall under the scope of the Directive and would have to regis-
ter."r' The draft also sets a higher exemption threshold of C500 mil-
lion for funds, which do not use leverage and have a five year lock-in
period since they are deemed to not present a systemic risk."'s
Introducing more regulation can have several drawbacks that
must be carefully examined prior to considering imposing new rules on
one part of the financial industry. This analysis can be carried out by
asking a set of questions described below.
Are the Potential Benefits Really Worth the Costs?
One cannot prevent what one cannot predict. In this regard,
regulation may be justified if more transparency is needed or when a
financial entity poses a systemic risk, which is more problematic in the
case of hedge funds.
Because the term "regulation" encompasses the regulation of
structure, reporting and activities, one must be extremely careful not
to draw too general a conclusion. Although some types of regulation
seem necessary, some are unnecessary. Regulation consisting of data
collection, for instance, allows risk anticipation to mitigate them and
avoid potential chain reactions. Allowing regulators to exercise deeper
oversight over the sector and to have access, under certain aforemen-
tioned conditions, to hedge fund data brings a certain benefit to the
financial system. Yet is this benefit really worth the costs and the en-
ergy governments are devoting to it at the moment?
One should never forget that introducing more regulation is
costly for governments, regulators, and the industry itself. It is esti-
assets-rebound-to-just-over-18-trillion.html?Task=report. The top 10 hedge funds
manage between $20 billion to $50.4 billion as of January 2010.
316 PFIARA, § 402.
317 Press Release, Europa, Financial Services: Commission Proposes EU Frame-
work for Managers of Alternative Investment Funds (Apr. 29, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/669.
:31 Id.
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mated that the AIFM Directive would cost C3.2 billion:"" to the hedge
fund/private equity industry due to rules on delegation and changes to
legal structures which may require the reorganization of the business
models, and around C27 million in ongoing compliance costs.321  Stud-
ies have also shown that the SEC's estimates are understated. 2 1
The term "costs" goes beyond the simple issue of compliance.
Here, costs refer to a broad category. The term encompasses the time
devoted to discuss, evaluate, vote for, enforce the new registration pro-
cess, audit and investigate, fill out forms, answer the regulator's de-
mands, set out new compliance procedures, and provide extensive
disclosures. It also refers to the above-mentioned compliance costs for
hedge funds and to a lesser extent to regulators, as well as to reduced
investment opportunities for investors.32 2
Costs in terms of personnel needs, especially the ones borne by
regulators, are often forgotten. Competent economists and analysts
are needed to process the information provided by hedge funds to
properly assess systemic risk and anticipate potential crisis. This is
particularly true for the SEC, which is essentially composed of law-
yers. The SEC would need to hire economists and experts in statistics
to exercise an effective oversight on hedge funds.
One must be extremely careful not to impose an excessive or
potentially harmful financial burden on hedge funds. This last remark
is particularly addressed to the "third country" provision of the AIFM
Directive. If this provision were to come into force, it would likely have
a disastrous financial impact on those funds and deter them and their
managers from doing business from and with the European Union.32 3
However, the argument is less relevant in the PFIARA case, which
does not impose excessive requirements prone to financially
destabilize hedge funds.
Finally, introducing new regulations can ultimately carry neg-
ative costs for the home country as it may impair its competitiveness.
For instance, London, the EU's main hub for investment manage-
319 La Proposition de Directive AIFM Pourrait Coriter 3,2 Milliards d'euros,
L'AGEFI, Oct. 16, 2009, available at http://www.agefl.fr/articles/La-proposition-di-
rective-AIFM-pourrait-couter-3-2-milliards-deuros-1111558.html.
320 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the Directive on costs, see Table 2 in
CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at 3.
321 Kentouris, supra note 248.
322 According to CRA, investment opportunities in hedge funds would be reduced
by 40% if the Directive were adopted. CHARLES RIVER Assocs., supra note 106, at
1.
323 See, e.g., AIFM 'Third Country' Threat Stirs Wide Concern, PRIVATEEQuiTYON-
LINE, Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.allbusiness.com/banking-finance/financial-mar-
kets-investing-securities/14107035-1.html.
3192011]
320 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:3
ment,324 could lose a huge part of its business if the Directive were
enacted as it is drafted today. More generally, one should think twice
before passing regulations that could put a $1.7 trillion industry em-
ploying 150,000 people worldwide out of business.325
What Effect Could Direct Regulation Have on Hedge Funds and
Financial Markets?
Introducing more regulation may also impair performances of
hedge funds and harm the financial markets. Empirical studieS326
demonstrate that there is causal link between the amount of regula-
tion and hedge fund performance and the fact that the current legal
regime in the United States is a source of Alpha.327 According to
Cumming,
[Tihe data indicate regulatory requirements in the form
of restrictions on the location of key service providers
and marketing channels that permit wrappers tend to be
associated with lower MPPMs [Manipulation-Proof
Performance Measures],328 lower alphas, lower average
returns, higher fixed fees and lower performance fees.
The standard deviation of returns is lower among
jurisdictions with restrictions on the location of key ser-
vice providers and higher minimum capitalization
requirements.32 9
The current regime also has advantages on the market itself
since hedge funds must constantly innovate to maintain their competi-
tive edge, which the current legal framework allows because of its ab-
sence of constraints. Although some argue that innovation tends to
develop more complex products that carry more risks, innovation is
first and foremost a key component of financial dynamism. Stifling
financial innovation may result in stifling growth. There are also con-
cerns that over-regulating hedge funds "may reduce liquidity, which
321 IFSL RESEARCH 2010, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
325 IFSL RESEARCH 2009, supra note 42, at 2.
326 For an empirical study on the impact of hedge fund regulation on performance,
see Douglas Cumming, A Law and Finance Analysis of Hedge Funds, Apr. 5, 2008.
The paper is based on an empirical analysis of a cross country dataset of 2137
hedge funds from twenty-four countries from January 2003 to December 2005.
21 Shadab, supra note 220.
328 Manipulation-Proof Performance Measure.
329 Cumming, supra note 326, at 4.
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would have a large negative effect on the markets," as Alan Greenspan
pointed out.*.o
Is the Proposed Regulation Flexible Enough to Meet Hedge Funds'
Characteristics?
Hedge funds are flexible investment vehicles tailored to meet
the requirements of various exemption regimes. When dealing with
investment management funds, one must keep in mind that imposing
strict regulations on them and/or on their advisers might not only
drive them away but may also be counterproductive and encourage
them to find loopholes.
New techniques and products could potentially be even more
dangerous for market stability because they would escape the regula-
tory scope. Lo's comment on what regulation should be is interesting
when he writes, "In]ew regulations should be adaptive and focused on
financial functions rather than institutions, making them more flexi-
ble and dynamic. "331
Christian de Boissieu, comparing the tension between financial
innovation and regulation to a "hide and seek game," concluded that
direct control of hedge funds would fail because the controlled instru-
ment would reappear elsewhere under a new name and a new form.
According to de Boissieu, it would better to rely on an indirect regula-
tion of those funds, consisting in reinforcing controls on counterpar-
ties. 332 This is also the opinion of CESR Chairman Eddy Wymeersch,
who suggested that systemic risk-related information be gathered
from prime brokers.3 3 3 Hellgardt also agrees, stating, "since it is not
warranted to destroy the hedge fund industry through heavy regula-
tory measures but rather to cultivate its beneficial impact on the fi-
nancial markets, while monitoring the dangers for systemic stability,
it is preferable to employ indirect regulatory techniques instead of re-
forming direct hedge fund regulation,"3 3 ' and to employ banks as gate-
keepers for minimal interference with hedge funds operations.
330 See John Horsfield-Bradbury, Hedge Fund Self-Regulation in the US and the
UK, Apr. 28, 2008, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/
corporate-governance/papers/Brudney2008_Horsfield-Bradbury.pdf.
331 Lo Testimony, supra note 206, at 3.
332 Christian de Boissieu, L'articulation entre regulation et crise dans le secteur
bancaire et financier, in Marie Anne Frison-Roche (sous la direction de), Les
risques de la r~gulation Volume 3, Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz, 2005, at 25.
333 E.U. Commission open hearing on hedge funds and private equity, February
26 and 27, 2009, available at E.U. Commission Hearing, supra note 189, at 17.
334 Alexander Hellgardt, Hedge Funds, the Financial Crisis, and Regulatory Com-
petition: How to Maintain U.S. Supremacy in Hedge Fund Incorporations,
Harvard Law School, 2010.
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These recommendations underline the need for strong enough
regulation to prevent hedge funds from becoming a threat to financial
stability, but not too much in order to avoid the counterproductive ef-
fects mentioned above. The challenge lies in finding the right balance
and appropriate measures that will provide benefits without creating a
burden on hedge funds' competitiveness and operations. This comes
down to determining whether regulation is always the best alternative
to reach the objectives sought and if similar goals are feasible
otherwise.
The hedge fund industry praises self-regulation, also known as
market discipline, which is organized by so-called SROs (self-regula-
tory organizations)."3 Primary examples include the Hedge Fund
Working Group in the United Kingdom, as well as the AlMA, MFA,
and the Asset Managers' Committee to the President's Working Group
on Financial Markets in the United States.
These SROs are well-established authorities. In Europe, the
Hedge Fund Standards Board (HFSB), set in 2008, aims at codifying
best practices. 3 6 Managers representing 60% of the European hedge
fund industry and $350 billion in assets follow the voluntary code of
conduct of the HFSB.m
In 2006, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke argued that
"[d]irect regulation may be justified when market discipline is ineffec-
tive at constraining excessive leverage and risk-taking but, in the case
of hedge funds, the reasonable presumption is that market discipline
can work."3 1' He further underlined the costs in terms of moral
hazards and the loss of private market discipline that direct regulation
would imply and well as the possible limits on funds' ability to provide
market liquidity.339 SROs tend to establish rules that are better tai-
lored to the realities and needs of the market and of the relevant activ-
ity.3 10 One of the main criticisms of the SEC was that its staff was
mainly composed of lawyers who may be disconnected from the reali-
335 See, e.g., David Weidner, Hedging the Feds: It's Time for Hedge Fund SRO,
MARKETWATCH, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/its-time-for-a-
hedge-fund-sro.
336 BlueCrest, Winton Sign Up For Voluntary Hedge Fund Code, FINALTERNA-
TIVEs, February 11, 2010, available at http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11391.
33 Id.
338 Bernanke, supra note 206.
3 1id.
340 Philipp Fischer, Self-Regulation in the Financial Sector - Status Quo and Fu-
ture Outlook, 7 (Harvard Law School, 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.
edu/programs/about/pifs/lm/select-papers-from-the-seminar-in-international-fi-
nancelllm-papers-2008 2009/fischer.pdf.
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ties of the industry they aim at regulating.:"' Self-regulation, through
a code of best practices, enjoys a higher degree of acceptance by the
governed. This, as Fischer noted, leads to a greater degree of compli-
ance by leveraging the industry's expertise and shifting at least part of
the regulatory burden from the public authority to the industry.3 4 2
Critics of self-regulation have voiced concerns about possible
conflicts of interests and how these codes of conduct could be en-
forced.34 ' The HFSB, for instance, specified in its response to an In-
ternational Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
consultation, "it is important to highlight that, while HFSB monitors
the Standards, it does not serve as a regulator and does not enforce
them."3 4
Therefore, I do not believe in control exercised solely by the in-
dustry but rather in a coordinated approach and in stronger coopera-
tion between regulators and SROs to create rules that are flexible
enough to adapt to this fast-paced changing financial environment. By
including SROs in the rule-making process, one may also achieve
greater compliance and limit by-pass behaviors. One way of appropri-
ately combining SROs and regulators would be to require mandatory
membership in industry associations, as proposed by Jiri Krol, Minis-
ter of Finance of the Czech Republic.14 1 Juraj has gone further by sug-
gesting that legislators should set basic goals and require regulators to
ensure that each category of funds adequately pursues these goals,
while assessments of adequacy should be matters of negotiation and,
in case of controversy, judicial determination.3 46 However, this model
raises many issues in terms of legal certainty, and even more so in
terms of how the SEC would treat funds that bridge several strategies
and do not fall into just one category.
Also interesting is the initiative of the Asset Managers' Com-
mittee to the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, which
341 See, e.g., Adam Peter & Michael D. Kinsman, Quest to Regulate Hedge Funds
Hits Speed Bump, 10 GRAzIAmio Bus. REV. (2007) available at http://gbr.pep-
perdine.edu/2010/08/sec-quest-to-regulate-hedge-funds-hits-speed-bump/.
342 Fischer, supra note 340, at 7.
343 E.U. Commission Hearing, supra note 189, at 18. Panelists John Gaine (of
MFA), Florence Lombard (of AIMA), and Dan Waters (of FSA) viewed industry
codes as a useful complement to regulation but pointed out the main problem with
the self-regulatory approach is enforcement.
344 Press Release, Hedge Fund Standards Board, HFSB Public Response to the
IOSCO Consultation Report on Hedge Fund Oversight 8 (Apr. 30, 2009) available
at http://www.hfsb.org/sites/10109/files/hfsb-response-iosco hf oversight_30_04
2009.pdf.
34 EU Commission open hearing on hedge funds and private equity, February 26
and 27, 2009 E.U. Commission Hearing, supra note 189, at 19.
346 Juraj, supra note 257, at 23.
323
324 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:3
released its "Best Practices" report, together with a separate "Inves-
tors' Report," to increase accountability for hedge fund managers.34 7
The President's Working Group believes that a large part of the re-
sponsibility of investment assessment should be on investors them-
selves. 3 4 8 A market regulatory system that sanctions managers who
do not comply with best practices principles, while also educating in-
vestors, could ensure that rules are effectively enforced without addi-
tional costs on regulators and managers.
At that point, a general recommendation can be made. When
contemplating more regulation, legislators should keep in mind that if
their interests and the industry's interests coincide, then rules will be
more effective and better enforced. Regulation is often seen as a pun-
ishment on certain activities or market players. This view, however, is
remedied by attempting to align all parties' interests.
1.2 Proposal for the Creation of a Global Database of Systemic Risk
The Dangers of Mandatory Public Disclosure
Legislators and regulators must understand hedge funds and
the impact any regulation may have on the industry, to achieve a rea-
sonable legal framework that will not jeopardize hedge fund activities
or their very existence. In that respect, initiatives such as the studies
of the AIFM Directive must be encouraged and developed.349
To illustrate how regulators' goals can directly conflict with
hedge funds activities, one can consider the provisions of both the
PFIARA and the AIFM Directive, which require disclosure of positions
and strategies. While there is a legitimate rationale in trying to assess
the risks posed by each hedge fund to limit systemic risk, it is not clear
that this information will remain confidential. If the purpose of these
provisions is to disclose this information to the public, there could be
dreadful consequences on the industry.
First, it raises an intellectual property issue. Hedge funds dis-
tinguish themselves from other funds by their investment strategies.
According to Lo, hedge funds are "among the most secretive of finan-
cial institutions because their franchise value is almost entirely based
347 BEST PRACTICES, supra note 18.
348 Horsfield-Bradbury, supra note 330, at 36.
349 See PFIARA. The PFIARA also includes a provision on cost study to be carried
out by the Comptroller General assessing the costs borne by investors and advis-
ers due to new requirements within two years of the enactment of PFIARA.
PFIARA, § 929Z. The Dodd version includes impact studies on the feasibility of a
self-regulatory organization to oversee private funds, on the accredited investor
standard and on short selling practices. Although this is a good initiative, carry-
ing such a study prior the enactment would be preferable in order to anticipate
rather than to adapt ex post.
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on the performance of their investment strategies, and this type of in-
tellectual property is perhaps the most difficult to patent." o If forced
to disclose such strategies, funds may not be able to maintain their
competitive edge, thus affecting their competitiveness and diminishing
their contributions to market liquidity.:"' Lo warned about the disas-
trous effects forced disclosure would entail."" According to him, the
most intellectually innovative funds would cease to exist or move to
less intrusive regulatory jurisdictions, generating a major loss to the
American capital markets.3 5 : This argument is easily applied to the
EU, where this provision could have a procyclic effect, increasing sys-
temic risk. Indeed, if rules have a negative impact on hedge funds and
lead them to fail, this will certainly not be an improvement for sys-
temic risk prevention.
Second, full disclosure could entail moral hazard issues, which
the Issing Committee highlighted in its report." According to the
Committee, full disclosure could lead hedge fund advisers to feel
"wrongfully safe" and therefore less cautious.ss
Third, making positions and strategies available to other funds
could lead to herding behaviors, which, as previously discussed, is
source of systemic risk. 5
Finally, there is a practical concern based on the ongoing col-
lection of hedge fund information. The Issing Committee called it "un-
realistic, because of the fast changes in fund exposures . . . and the
enormous data collection and analytical requirements involved."3 5 1
Bernanke also rejected day-to-day hedge fund monitoring, stating:
A system in which hedge funds and other highly lever-
aged market participants submit position information to
an authority that aggregates that information and
reveals it to the market would probably not be able to
address the concern about liquidity risk. Protection of
proprietary information would require so much aggrega-
tion that the value of the information to market partici-
pants would be substantially reduced.15 1








358 Bernanke, supra note 206.
2011] 325
326 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:3
Preliminary remarks
Therefore, this paper advocates for a cautious approach to data
collection. It supports the idea that all information gathered be kept
anonymous and confidential, accessible for the sole purpose of assess-
ing risks and for the use of regulators. To do so will guarantee that
hedge funds will be able to carry out their strategies while allowing
regulators to properly exercise their control. This paper also supports
the idea that the burden of proving that information is necessary to
assess systemic risk should be placed upon regulators,"s' to avoid ex-
cessive requests. It also argues that the day-to-day collection of data is
irrelevant, excessive, and costly. Information should be collected on a
monthly basis, or more frequently only in volatile markets, and only if
regulators prove it to be necessary.
Finally, this monitoring will only be effective if information is
shared on a global scale, through an alert system for instance. When a
regulator would detect a significant risk, the alert system would send
an alert to regulators of jurisdictions in which the fund is a potential
threat. There is no longer national systemic risk due to the intercon-
nectedness of economies. Only by achieving effective global coopera-
tion can risks be properly mitigated. And, therefore, cooperation
among regulators is key.
For a Global Database of Financial Information
Taking into account all the arguments developed above, this
paper recommends the creation of a global database of financial infor-
mation.3 6 0 The term "financial information" would include all useful
and relevant information necessary to carry out a proper assessment
of systemic risk, such as information on leverage, value-at risk
(VaR),ael collateral, liquidity needs, use of financial instruments (espe-
3 This recommendation was made by the Committee on Capital Markets Regula-
tion. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 245, at 13.
360 This recommendation was developed in the report prepared by the think-tank
Club Praxis. See Club Praxis Rapport Flash sur la Regulation Financi&e Sys-
temique, New York, Dec. 9, 2009, available at http://www.clubpraxis.com/en/rap-
ports/rapport-flash-sur-le-risque-systemique/. (Please note that the English
version provided is for information only. The author used the original, French ver-
sion.) The report recommends that this database be a G20 initiative placed under
the supervision of the Forum of Financial Stability. Id.
61 The Value at Risk "measures how much the institution can be harmed by mar-
ket moves: it is concerned with the marginal loss distribution of the institutions
portfolio." See Cont, Moussa & Minca, supra note 169. The VaR may be an inter-
esting indicator but measuring systemic risk implies that one understands how
much the financial system can be harmed by the failure of an institution. There-
fore, additional indicators may be needed. The paper mentioned in this footnote
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cially complex financial instruments such as over-the-counter deriva-
tives), and information about the interconnectedness to other large
financial institutions.
Hedge funds would disclose such data but any other financial
entity that is potentially systemically significant would be required to
do so as well.: " To do so would allow regulators to understand the
structures and dynamics of interconnections between financial institu-
tions and to develop an ex-ante approach to regulation of systemic risk.
This approach is probably the most effective way to deal with such
complex financial networks. The information gathered on hedge funds
would remain confidential and anonymous in order to avoid the intel-
lectual property issues already discussed.
On February 25, 2010, IOSCO, whose membership includes
95% of the world's securities markets, released a template for the
global collection of hedge fund information to be disclosed every six
months that "will assist in assessing possible systemic risks arising
from the sector.""' Even though the organization has no formal au-
thority to impose these disclosure requirements on hedge funds, its
members are committed to follow its guidelines. This initiative is cer-
tainly a first step toward international cooperation, but several reser-
vations may be mentioned. This template diverges from the above
proposal in several respects.
First, this provision is insufficient as it only targets hedge
funds. Therefore, it fails to make this global database a true systemic
risk monitoring tool that would encompass other financial institutions
and allow a complete assessment to account for mutual exposures.
Second, it is not clear that this information will be kept confidential
from public view, which is problematic. The third concern has to do
with enforcement, as IOSCO does not have any direct authority on
hedge funds.
proposes two new measures of systemic risk which this author finds compelling:
the "default impact" which measures the connectivity with other market partici-
pants and the magnitude of exposures, and the "expected systemic loss" measure.
362 In this respect, a proportionate approach like the FSA's which requires only
the U.K.'s larger hedge fund managers to report systemically-relevant data would
be desirable, as not all hedge funds are likely to pose a systemic risk.
363 International regulators publish systemic risk data requirements for hedge
funds, see e.g., Press Release, International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS1
79.pdf.
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2. The Challenge of Developing a Global Approach to Hedge Fund
Regulation
2.1 The Difficulties of Developing Global Standards
In today's world, markets are interconnected and finance ig-
nores borders. On the other hand, the law is confined within a defined
territory, creating a disjunction between territorial regulation and
global activities. This general remark applies to hedge funds and
might be one of the greatest challenges facing financial law.
Indeed, the financial market is faced with operations and in-
vestors in different jurisdictions in addition to the potential conflicting
regulations issues and high costs of compliance. There also exists the
risk of forum shopping since the absence of a coordinated approach at
the international level allows hedge funds to move to less stringent
jurisdictions out of the reach of regulatory oversight-which is hardly
good news for the efforts to mitigate systemic risk.
Florence Lombard, Executive Director of the AIMA, called for a
system of mutual recognition of international standards even from off-
shore jurisdictions."' A coordinated approach to regulation is much
more effective and less costly.
Achieving a globally harmonized legal framework for hedge
funds appears utopian, at least for now. As Part I demonstrated, there
is no common regulatory approach in the United States or within the
EU. As Part II conveyed, the current reform proposals did not seize
the opportunity to promote a coordinated approach.
There still is no consensus on what form regulation should take
or on what material should be regulated. Even within the EU, mem-
ber states fight among themselves to impose their own visions of finan-
cial regulation and do not seem to be willing to compromise and move
toward greater harmonization.
This paper does not support the idea that international finan-
cial regulation is unatainable. It only acknowledges the structural
and cultural elements that must be considered by those willing to over-
come those difficulties and promote an international framework.
Deep philosophical and cultural differences have shaped differ-
ent conceptions of regulation in general, and of regulation of invest-
ment vehicles in particular. On one side, the U.K., the U.S., and to a
lesser extent Italy, favor a flexible approach to hedge fund regulation.
On the other hand, France and Germany continue to push for further
regulation. Understanding these divergences is the first step to over-
coming them and developing an international legal framework.
These differences may, first of all, be rooted in the very concep-
tion of the role of the state. France and Germany have a strong state
364 E.U. Commission Hearing, supra note 189, at 17.
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intervention tradition while the U.S. has traditionally taken a more
liberal approach. This may also come from the role of the law itself in
each country. France has always been a highly regulated country with
frantic legislative activity, while the United States regulates more
lightly and only when necessary.
The way each of the countries discussed regard hedge funds is
also influenced by the importance of the industry in these countries.
For instance, France and Germany may not be so concerned about the
impact of hedge fund regulation on their economies because this im-
pact would not be so significant. On the other hand, the U.K. and the
U.S. have a strong incentive to preserve their competitiveness as the
two main financial centers for hedge funds.
Finally, despite the efforts of the G20, there seems to be a com-
petition between the jurisdictions mentioned in this paper to impose
their own vision of regulation in a very chauvinistic way, which is ar-
guably prejudicial.a'
In today's financial world, one can no longer afford this nation-
alism for another age. It is regrettable that regulators and politicians
have made statements jeopardizing efforts to build effective interna-
tional cooperation. For instance, when asked what should be done at
the European level to deal with hedge funds, the President of the
French AMF said, "setting the example and not be subject to a regula-
tion that would be strictly American."3" Also consider EU Commis-
sioner Michel Barnier, who declared he would not be bullied by "Paris
or London and certainly not by Washington.""' Likewise, FSA offi-
cials publicly stated that the U.K. would not make any compromise on
the current draft of the AIFM Directive, and Angela Merkel verbally
attacked Gordon Brown over his refusal to move forward with the
Directive.36
Beyond philosophical and cultural differences, there is a com-
petitiveness issue that slows the internationalization of financial regu-
lation. Indeed, although achieving a level-playing field seems
compelling in many respects, many countries fight to keep their com-
365 Some actually see the absence of harmonization as a good thing. Indeed, regu-
latory competition may be seen as a stimulating element that motivates attempts
to reach better legal systems which ultimately brings benefits and contributes to
the improvement of legal frameworks. This idea, although unpractical from a
hedge fund regulation point of view, is nonetheless interesting.
366 Intervention de Jean-Pierre Jouyet, President de l'AMF, Confdrence sur les
Hedge Funds, Bruxelles, February 26, 2009.
367 British Block Euro. Hedge Fund Rules, FINALTERNATIVES, Mar. 16, 2010, avail-
able at http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11781.
368 Tony Czuczka & Patrick Donahue, Merkel Berates U.K. Over Hedge-Funds,
Bus. WK., Mar. 17, 2010.
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petitive edge in sometimes protectionist ways. This is what Joseph
Stiglitz developed in a recent article when he stated:
[E]ach country looks at each proposal and assesses how
it affects the competitiveness of its financial system; the
objective too often is to find a regulatory regime that
crimps competitors more than one's own companies. As
the saying goes, all politics is local, and, at least in the
US and many other jurisdictions, finance is a big politi-
cal player. 69
2.2 Overcoming Divergences and Differences to Effectively Mitigate
Systemic Risk on a Global Scale
If I do agree with Stiglitz's above statement, which identifies a
real issue, I do not agree with the remedy he advocates. He claims
that since achieving global coordination seems difficult, there is no
time to lose in trying to do so. According to Stiglitz, because each
country is responsible for "ensuring the safety and stability of its fi-
nancial system and economy ... [i]t is far better to have strong action
now and then harmonize the regulatory structures later. It may be
'second best' but far better than the third-best alternative of delayed
and ineffective regulation."3 7 o
Given the nature of systemic risk and the interconnectedness
of the financial markets, delaying efforts to develop a coherent global
framework for entities with global operations is hardly conceivable
and is certainly not the best alternative. Since the PFIARA and the
AIFM are simultaneously discussed, one can deplore that the opportu-
nity to promote a global approach to hedge fund regulation was not
seized despite the recommendations of the G20, of many committees,
think tanks, and academics publications.
Failure to achieve global standards in current reform proposals
does not mean that efforts in that sense do not exist. Examples of
these efforts to develop global cooperation may be illustrated by the
existence of bilateral agreements between regulators such as the
"Memorandum of Understanding on Consultation, Cooperation and
the Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the Su-
pervision of Financial Services Firms" between the FSA in the U.K.
and the SEC in the United States.3 7 1 The "strategic dialogue" between
the two regulators was initiated in 2006, and the fifth meeting in Feb-
369 Joseph Stiglitz, Watchdogs Need Not Bark Together, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010.
:170 Id.
371 SEC & FSA, Memorandum of Understanding on Consultation, Cooperation
and the Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight and the Supervi-
sion of Financial Services Firms (2006), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
moulfsa sec.pdf.
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ruary 2010 discussed, among other things, the regulation of hedge
funds and investment advisers."7 Efforts have also been made within
the G20, IOSCO, the CESR, and various fora and committees to de-
velop international standards, which should be encouraged. Yet, if
such initiatives exist, they are often more formal and rarely lead to
legal harmonization, often because they are confronted with legisla-
tors who are not willing to go down that path.
The most advanced example of global cooperation to this date
remains at the level of the SROs. They indeed easily generate consen-
sus within the industry. The guidelines they provide the industry are
flexible and easily transposable on a global level. Andrew J. Donohue,
Director of the Division on Investment Management at the SEC, re-
ferred to such rules as "an excellent model for the way in which indus-
try can work together with regulators around the globe to develop
smart and sensible solutions to hedge fund regulatory issues and to
strengthen and enhance confidence in all of our markets." 3 7 3
In other words, it seems the hedge fund industry is ready for
an international legal framework, but governments and regulators
still struggle to overcome their national particularisms. This leads to
deadlock. Harmonization of legal frameworks appears illusory since
regulators continue to contemplate national-based reforms when an ef-
fective prevention of systemic risk calls for international cooperation.
The proposal presented in this paper takes this structural diffi-
culty into account. It acknowledges the natural tendency of jurisdic-
tions to handle regulation on a national basis. The creation of a global
database of systemic risk does not negate national prerogatives to reg-
ulate as each country sees fit, but promotes a framework for global
cooperation via an information sharing system superimposed on na-
tional regulations.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
This paper has reviewed existing legal frameworks applicable
to hedge funds in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Ger-
many, and Italy. It concludes that additional regulation is not neces-
sary, and in certain cases would potentially be counterproductive or
even dangerous if improperly tailored to this industry's needs and
characteristics.
372 See Press Release, FSA, SEC and UK FSA Hold Fifth Meeting of the SEC-FSA
Strategic Dialogue (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Li-
brary/Communication/PR/2010/021.shtml; SEC, FSA To Boost Cooperation On
Hedge Funds, FINALTERNATIVES, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.finalternatives.com/
node/11207.
37 Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., SEC Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Keynote Address at the 9th
Annual International Conference on Private Investment Funds, (Mar. 10, 2008).
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The paper deplores the lack of global coordination and conver-
gence in current efforts to reform the hedge fund legal framework. It
recommends hedge funds remain lightly regulated and that increased
harmonization be reached through private initiatives that have
demonstrated their success in developing international best practice
standards, which are now widely accepted by the industry and
implemented.
Nonetheless, this paper acknowledges that hedge funds raise
legitimate concerns about systemic risk, and that action should be
taken in order to mitigate potential threats to financial stability. Sys-
temic risk is neither national nor limited to one player. It must be
treated using a coordinated and global approach. As a report of the
British Academy very well noted, "[r]isk calculations were most often
confined to slices of financial activity, using some of the best mathe-
matical minds in our country and abroad. But they frequently lost
sight of the bigger picture."3" In order to reach this "bigger picture,"
this paper recommends the creation of an international database that
would collect all the financial positions and the counterparts of all the
major financial institutions and monitor systemic risk on a global scale
through increased cooperation efforts.
PART V: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Since this paper was written in April 2010, the United States
and in the European Union enacted major legislative developments.
In the United States, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2009, also known as Dodd-Frank Act ("The Act"),"7
was enacted on July 21, 2010 and more than 200 implementing mea-
sures are expected to be issued by various agencies by July 2011, by
the time the Act becomes effective.
On the other side of the Atlantic, on November 11, 2010, the
European Parliament adopted the controversial Alternative Invest-
ment Fund Managers ("AIFM") Directive (collectively, the "Directive")
after months of disagreements and intense debates. The Directive
shall be published in 2011, and it will come into force on January 1,
2013.
This section provides a short overview :371 of the main provi-
sions of Title IV of the Act (Part 1) and of the AIFM Directive (Part 2),
while keeping in mind that both reforms will be implemented progres-
3 Letter from British Academyto Her Majesty The Queen (July 22, 2009), availa-
ble at http://media.ft.com/cms/3e3b6ca8-7a08-1lde-b86f-00144feabdcO.pdf.
a Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
376 Under no circumstances should this additional section be considered as an ex-
haustive summary of two long and complex statutes.
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sively, through a process which will involve regulators and market
participants and entail many consultations, discussions and the draft-
ing of many rules. The paper underlines, when relevant, the various
elements for which the industry still awaits precision and offers some
comments about both reforms.
1. The Dodd Frank Act
Title IV of the Act,3" entirely devoted to private fund advisers,
amends the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. It starts with a defini-
tion of the term "private fund." Rather than defining a private fund,
which would have been a nearly impossible task and would not have
had the breadth to encompass all types of funds, 7 structures or strat-
egies, Congress compromised and drafted the following wording "a
private fund means an issuer that would be an investment company,
as defined in §3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for
§3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of that Act." 3 7
The Act was marketed as the statute that would finally regu-
late hedge funds. Often depicted as unregulated investment vehicles,
hedge funds were never completely unregulated and thus, the Act does
not create a framework for hedge fund regulation. Rather, the Act in-
creases the level of scrutiny and requirements to which hedge funds
are subject, both through the mandatory registration of private fund
advisers with the SEC and through tougher standards regulating
some of the operations they carry out.aso
Title IV eliminates the private adviser exemption and amends
§203(b)(3) of the IAA.3 1 Effective July 2011, private fund advisers in-
cluding hedge fund advisers will be required to register with the SEC
unless they fall into one of the following exemptionS382 in which case
they become exempt from registration with the SEC.3 83
37 The PFIARA mentioned throughout the paper was incorporated into the
Dodd Frank Act and is now known both as the Private Fund Investment Advisers
Registration Act of 2010 and as Title IV of the Dodd Frank Act: "Regulation of
Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others."
378 See supra, Part III, 1.1.
379 Dodd-Frank Act § 402.
380 E.g. proprietary trading, use of derivatives, etc. See Dodd-Frank Act.
381 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 401-416.
382 Exempt advisers may be required to maintain records and provides reports to
the SEC should the SEC deem it "necessary and appropriate."
383 Exempt advisers are not prohibited from registering with the SEC, even if they
fall within the scope of one of the above mentioned exemptions. They may decide to
register on a voluntary basis provided that they hold at least $100 million in as-
sets under management.
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(1) Advisers that act solely as investment advisers to one
or more venture capital fund; 384
(2) Investment advisers acting solely as advisers to pri-
vate funds whose assets under management in the
United States do not exceed $150 million;385
(3) "Family offices;"386
(4) Foreign private advisers that have no place of busi-
ness in the United States, have fewer than 15 clients and
investors and whose aggregate assets under manage-
ment from such clients and investors are less than $25
million, or such higher amount as the SEC may by rule
determine;"
(5) Advisers to small business investment companies.3 8 8
Title IV reallocates the responsibility for oversight of invest-
ment advisers at the state and at the federal level. It requires private
fund advisers with assets between $25 million and $100 million of as-
sets under management to register with the state. According to the
SEC, approximately 4100 investment advisers would switch from SEC
to state registration as a result of the enactment of the Act.3 8 9 How-
ever, it should be noted that the minimum assets threshold for SEC
registration may be lowered to $25 million in certain cases. If an ad-
viser is neither subject to nor required to register with the securities
commissioner of the state where its principal office or place of business
is located, or when the adviser would otherwise be required to register
with 15 or more states, then the minimum asset threshold may be
lowered.
The Act also redefines the articulation between the SEC and
the CFTC. Advisers that are already registered with the CFTC for
purposes of trading in commodities are exempt from SEC registration
so long as they do not become predominantly involved with securities
related advice.
384 Dodd-Frank Act § 407. The SEC shall adopt rules to define the term "venture
capital" within one year of the enactment of the Act.
385 Id. § 408. It should be noted that Section 408 further provides in respect of
mid-sized funds (term to be defined) that the SEC "shall take into account the size,
governance and investment strategy of such funds to determine whether they pose
systemic risk, and shall provide for registration and examination procedures with
respect to the investment advisers of such funds which reflect the level of systemic
risk posed by such funds."
386 Id. § 409. The section provides guidelines for the SEC to define this term.
387 Id. § 403.
388 Dodd-Frank Act § 403.
:389 Securities and Exchange Commission, 17CFR Part 275 Release no IA-3110;
File S7-36-10 "Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940," at 9.
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Mandatory registration entails many requirements for report-
ing390 recordkeeping, disclosures, or collection of systemic risk data.
Under Section 404 of the Act, private fund advisers will be required to
provide extensive information and data regarding the amount of assets
under management, the use of leverage, the counterparty credit risk
exposure, trading and investment positions, valuation policies and
practices, or the types of assets held.3 9 ' Beyond the list provided by
the Act, the SEC will be given a broad discretion and authority to re-
quest any information "necessary and appropriate in the public inter-
est and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic
risk by the Financial Stability Oversight Council" (FSOC).3 2
This wording raises several concerns already discussed in
greater detail in this paper. The first of these concerns is the heavy
burden such requirements inflicts upon private advisers. The formula-
tion of the provision extends the SEC extensive powers to request a
tremendous amount of information that advisers will need to collect,
process, and file. Such increased duties will increase the costs of com-
pliance and will most likely be extremely prejudicial to small hedge
funds.
Another critical issue, as explained earlier in this paper is con-
fidentiality. The Act provides that the SEC should maintain a high
level of confidentiality of the reports and information with which it is
provided. However, the Act also provides that the SEC share this in-
formation with the FSOC, and doesn't withhold any information from
Congress, courts, federal departments, or self-regulated organizations
if they require access to these documents. These institutions must
maintain a level of confidentiality consistent with the level established
by the SEC. Even with such standards prescribed by the SEC, one
may fear that confidential information, confidential strategies or valu-
ation models shared among two, three or ten different bodies may not
stay confidential very long. The manner in which the SEC and the
FSOC handle confidentiality will have an undoubtedly significant im-
pact on hedge fund operations and must therefore be treated with
great caution.
Finally, the Act reinforces the supervision of the SEC over pri-
vate fund advisers by granting a wide array of powers and authority.
However, the question of the budget of the SEC is troublesome because
it has not increased as in relation to its responsibilities. Indeed, the
390 Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 75
Fed. Reg. 77052, 77054 (Dec. 10, 2010)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 and
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task that awaits the SEC is daunting and many have expressed con-
cerned about the quality and the fairness of the rulemaking process. "9 3
In less than a year, the SEC needs to adopt and implement hundreds
of rules, create new offices, redefine standards such as the accredited
investor standard, or carry out studies. As Chairman Schapiro
points out, the SEC will soon have to process the data of an additional
750 private fund advisers registering for the first time with roughly
the same resources and with few economists to analyze the data.a95
Although collecting data is important and may help to prevent a crisis,
data collection is pointless without analysis to carry out satisfactory
ex-ante monitoring.
In addition to closer scrutiny by the SEC, hedge funds may also
be subject to supervision by the newly created FSOC.'"9 This new su-
pervision may require a;
[n]onbank financial company[to] become subject to con-
solidated, prudential supervision by the Board if the
Council determines that material financial distress at
the company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentra-
tion, interconnectedness, or mix of the company['s] activ-
ities, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the
United States.
In addition, hedge funds and other organizations will be re-
quired to file a form on a quarterly basis, the content of which is cur-
rently being discussed between the SEC and the CFTC, aimed at
assessing which funds are systemically important.' 9 As of today, it
may still be too early to comment on the implication of systemic risk
monitoring for hedge funds because too many terms still require defi-
nition. For example: 1) What does being "predominantly engaged in
financial activities" mean?; and 2) How can one measure if a fund is a
"significant nonbank financial company"?
3 See, e.g., Implementation of Dodd-Frank : Hearing before the S. Comm. On
Banking, House and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (opening statement of Sen.
Richard C. Shelby, Ranking Member, S. Comm. On Banking).
39 Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, SEC, (proposed Jan. 25, 2011)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 275).
3 Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Hearing on the Over-
sight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: A Progress Report by the Regulators at the
Half-Year Mark (Feb. 17, 2011).
396 Press release, U.S. Sec. * Exch. Comm'n, SEC Proposes Private Fund Systemic
Risk Reporting Rule (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2011/2011-23.htn.
3 Definitions of <Predominantly Engaged in Financial Activities>> and <Signifi-
cant" Nonbank Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, 76 Fed. Reg.
7732 (Feb 11, 2011) (to be codified at 12 CFR pt. 225).
398 Id.
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The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve has yet to
choose a method for determining whether a fund is significant. The
Board could adopt an objective quantitative method by setting a
threshold of assets under management above which a nonbank finan-
cial company will be deemed "significant" or the Board could favor a
case-by-case approach, which may seem fairer, but may generate more
legal uncertainty.
The creation of the FSOC may be an interesting first step to-
wards the creation of a global database of systemic risk information.
It will be extremely interesting to see how the FSOC will operate and
to see whether it will be a relevant forum, effectively gathering data
from all systemically important entities and effectively interacting
with foreign regulators.
Thus, the Act extends the scope of the IAA but does not signifi-
cantly modify the general philosophy under which the United States
regulates hedge funds. Although the Act demands more transparency
and greater oversight, the extent to which it will impact the industry
is unknown and will ultimately be determined at the implementation.
Through implementing measures, regulators could either be quite per-
missive towards hedge funds rendering a minimal impact on their bus-
iness or could seek to regulate these investment vehicles in a detailed
and stringent fashion that would resemble the European approach.
2. The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
In November 2010, after months of controversy and several
drafts, the European Parliament adopted one of the most controversial
European Directives. The directive aimed at laying down the rules for
the authorization, ongoing operations and transparency of AIFM,
which, until then, were regulated at the national level.
Under the Directive, AIFM means any legal person whose reg-
ular business is managing one or more alternative investment fund
(AIF)."' An AIF means, "any collective investment undertaking
which raises capital from a number of investors, with a view to invest-
ing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of
those investors," which does not require authorization pursuant to the
UCITS Directive400 and which shall have a single AIFM.4 01
399 Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, P7_TA-PROV(2010) 0393,
European Parliament Legislative resolution of 11 November 2010 on the Proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative In-
vestment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/.. ./EC.
[hereinafter AIFMD] Please note that, while it has been voted on, the Directive
has not yet been published.
400 AIFMD, Art. 3(b) and (c) [hereinafter AIFMD]. The UCITS Directive refers to
the Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July
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Like the Dodd Frank Act, the Directive will come into force at
the end of an implementation process which will be carried out at dif-
ferent levelS402 by the European Commission, the newly created Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority ("ESMA"),403 national market
authorities and the law of each Member state.40'4 Although the Direc-
tive creates a harmonized regulatory framework for all Member states,
each Member state will be able to apply stricter standards at their dis-
cretion, as long as these standards do not discriminate against AIFM
of other Member states. Therefore, despite a desire to coordinate
hedge fund regulation within the EU, a fragmented regulatory land-
scape with slight differences from one Member state to another may
still persist.
The Directive applieS405 to (1) all EU AIFM who manage one or
more AIFs whether or not in the EU, (2) all non-EU AIFM who man-
age one or more EU AIF and (3) all non-EU AIFM who market one or
more AIFs whether an EU AIF or a non-EU AIF in the EU.
13, 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations, and administrative provisions
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities.
401 AIFMD, Art. 3a.
402 The implementation of the AIFMD will follow a classical Lamfalussy process.
Level 1: the Commission adopts a formal proposal for Directive and the European
Parliament and Council reach an agreement on framework principles of imple-
menting powers in the Directive. Level 2: the Commission requests advice from
the ESRC (now ESMA) on technical implementing measures. The ESMA prepares
advice in consultation with market participants and submits it to the Commission,
which examines it and makes a proposal to the European Securities Committee.
This committee votes on the proposal and the Commission adopts the measures.
Level 3: the ESMA works on joint recommendations, consistent guidelines and
common standards. Level 4: Member states implement the legislation and the
Commission verifies that they are in compliance" Commission Staff Working Doc-
ument The Application Of The Lamfalussy Process To Eu Securities Markets Legis-
lation A preliminary assessment by the Commission servicesAnnex 1: The four-level
regulatory approach under the Lamfalussy process available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/sec-2004-1459_en.pdf.
403 The ESMA has replaced the Committee of European Securities Regulators on
January 1, 2011.
404 It is expected that nearly 100 implementing measures will need to be taken
before 2013. See European Commission, Directorate General Internal Market and
Services, Provisional Request for Technical Advice on the Directive for Alternative
Investment Managers (AIFM) Level 2 Measures, December 2, 2010.
1115 See AIFMD, Art. 2. Note that the Directive applies to these three categories
regardless of the AIFM legal form, of whether the AIF is open or closed-ended and
of whether the AIF is constituted under the law of contract or under trust law.
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The Directive provides a list of entities that fall outside the
scope of the Directive" 6 as well as a list of exemptions.0 AIFM who
manage one or more AIFs whose only investors are the AIFM or the
parent's undertakings or the subsidiaries of the AIFM or other subsidi-
aries of those parent undertakings, provided that none of those inves-
tors itself is an AIF are exempt from the provisions of the Directive.
AIFM who manage portfolios of AIFs whose assets under manage-
ment, including any assets acquired through use of leverage do not
exceed e 100 million, or do not exceed C 500 million when the portfolio
consists of AIF that are unleveraged and have no redemption right ex-
ercisable during a period of five years following the initial investment
are subject to limited provisions40s although they may decide to opt-in
and seek full authorization under the Directive in order to benefit from
the rights granted thereunder.
To manage an AIF, an AIFM must apply for authorization in
its home Member state and provide extensive information about the
AIFM, on how it complies with the requirements of the Directive, and
about each AIF it manages including information regarding invest-
ment strategies, remuneration policies, leverage, and risk profiles.4 0 9
Once granted, and only if the conditions for authorization are met,4 1 0
the authorization is valid in every Member state and the AIFM must
notify the competent authorities of any material changes to the condi-
tions for initial authorization.4 1 '
Unlike Title IV of the Act, which is quite concise and does not
fundamentally change the U.S approach to hedge fund regulation, the
Directive is a long and complex statute, comprised of 56 articles and
more than 130 pages, dealing with nearly every possible aspects of
hedge fund regulation ranging from initial capital requirements, 4 12 to
406 See Id. Holding companies, institutions covered by the 2003 Directive on the
activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision, su-
pranational institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the ECB, the EIB etc.,
national central banks, national, regional and local governments and bodies, in-
cluding those supporting social security or pension systems, employee participa-
tion or savings schemes, and securitization special purpose entities.
407 Id. Art. 2a.
408 They must be registered with the competent authorities in their home Member
state and identity itself and the AIF managed, provide information on the invest-
ment strategies of the AIF managed and on the main instruments in which they
are trading, on exposures and on the most important concentrations of AIF they
manageEU, and notify the competent authority if they cross the applicable thresh-
old in which case they should seek full authorization within 30 days.
409 AIFMD, Art. 5.
410 Id. Art. 6 and 6a.
411 Id. Art. 7.
412 Id. Art. 6a.
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the appointment of a single depositary,4 13 remuneration policies, 4 14
risk management,4 1 s conflicts of interests,416 liquidity manage-
ment,417 investment in securitization positions,4 18 valuation, 419 disclo-
sure and reporting obligations,420 leverage,42 1 or organizational
requirements.
Such substantive and heavy requirements bring a fundamental
change to the hedge fund industry that will require fund managers to
rethink and potentially restructure the way they operate as well as
causing hedge fund managers to spend large amounts of capital in
compliance costs. In this context and facing such draconian measures,
it is likely that some AIFM will choose to leave the European market
for jurisdictions with lighter regulation.
While implementing the Directive, the Commission, the ESMA
and Member states should refrain from adopting measures that would
be too stringent and seek flexibility as much as possible. As developed
earlier in this paper, overburdening these investment vehicles with too
many rules that may not be relevant may be counterproductive. More-
over, the manner in which confidential information will be processed
by the competent authorities is still unclear and one may fear that this
issue may not be given the level of caution required.
The heart most controversial part of the Directive lies in Chap-
ters VI and VII, which are devoted to the right to market to profes-
sional investorS422 throughout the EU under what is commonly known
as the EU "passport." Under national private placement regimes,
AIFM had to seek authorization in each of the countries in which they
wanted to market. From 2013 for EU AIFM and 2015 for third coun-
tries AIFM, hedge funds will be allowed to market fund interests any-
where throughout the EU once authorized in one Member state.
This is a major step forward, but also was a bone of contention.
Indeed, while the Directive was under discussion, a group of countries,
France among them, expressed concerns regarding the subjection of
413 Id. Art. 18a.
414 AIFMD, Art. 9a.
415 Id. Art. 11.
416 Id. Art. 10.
417 Id. Art. 12.
419 Id. Art. 13.
419 Id. Art. 16.
420 AIFMD, Art. 19-21.
421 Id. Art. 25.
422 Article 35j provides that Member states may allow AIFM to market to retail
investors on their territory and impose stricter requirements on AIFM. They may
not however impose stricter requirements or additional requirements on EU AIF
established in another Member state and marketed on a cross border basis than on
AIF marketed domestically, in order to avoid protectionism issues.
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non-EU AIFM to lighter regulatory requirements or the possibility
that "unsupervised" AIFM would be granted the right to market in the
EU In a protectionist fashion, these countries pushed for a proposal
allowing some Member states to opt-out of the passport or delay a deci-
sion on the passport. U.S Secretary of Treasury Geithner qualified
such a proposal as "discriminatory" and "damaging to our shared in-
terest in maintaining an open global financial system.":2 The final
version of the Directive allows third countries to access the internal
market with the passport.
However, the implementing measures must be seen, in particu-
lar those regarding cooperation agreements (see table below), in order
to assess whether protectionism definitively belongs to the past or, if
through these measures, the ESMA and Member states will conduct a
screening process that would knowingly exclude AIFM and AIF from
certain jurisdictions. The following table summarizes the key provi-
sions applicable to domestic funds and fund managers as well as "third
country" funds and managers.
EUAIF Non-EUAIF
The passport will be available to
EU AIFM marketing EU AIF in
the European Union in 2013, pro-
vided that they meet the require-
ments of the Directive and provid-
ed that a notification 4 24 is submit-
ted with the competent authorities
of the AIFM's home Member state
in respect to each EU AIF that it
intends to market.
From 2015, EU AIFM managing non-EU
AIF will be able to market to professional
investors in the EU with the European
passport 4 25 provided that they comply with
the requirements of the Directive. They
must notify the competent authorities, that
"appropriate cooperation arrangements are
in place between the competent authorities
of the home Member state of the AIFM and
the supervisory authorities of the third
country where the non-EU AIF is estab-
lished in order to ensure at least an effi-
cient exchange of information", that the
third country is not "listed as a Non Coop-
erative Country and Territory by the Fi-
nancial Action Task Force on anti money
laundering and terrorist financing" and
that the third country where the AIF is
based has signed an agreement with the
home Member State of the AIFM and with
each other Member state in which the AIF
is to be marketed that fully complies with
the OECD Model Tax Convention stan-
dards.4 2 6
423 T.Geithner, Letters to C.Largarde, G.Osborne and W. Schauible, October 5,
2010.
424 AIFD, Art. 31. The content of such notification is set forth in Annex III of the
AIFMD.
425 The passport is not mandatory and that the Directive also sets forth the condi-
tions for an EU AIFM managing a non EU AIF to market in the European Union
without a passport in Article 35c.
426 AIFD, Art. 35a.
EUAIFM
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Non-EU
AIFM
In order to manage and market
EU AIF under the European pass-
port,4 2 7 available in 2015, a non-EU AIFM must comply with the
provisions of the Directive, 42 8 ob-
tain authorization and have a le-
gal representative established in
the Member state of reference4 29
who shall be the contact point of
the AIFM in the European Union
for the investors, for the ESMA
and for competent authorities. 4 30
Requirements in terms of coopera-
tion agreement, anti money laun-
dering regulations and OECD
model tax agreements also apply
to non AIFM managing/marketing
EU AIF and as for all AIFM, a no-
tification is required prior to mar-
keting the AIF. 43 1
The global financial crisis led to major legislative efforts in
both the United States and in the EU to anticipate and prevent future
crises. The common idea behind both legislative initiatives was to in-
crease both the depth and breadth of regulation, that is, more regula-
tions and more financial institutions regulated. This postulate, as this
entire paper demonstrated, is highly questionable; the benefits of such
reforms for investors and for the financial system altogether will not
likely outweigh the costs entailed.
It is premature to provide a conclusive assessment because im-
plementing measures will greatly influence the actual impact that the
reforms will have on hedge funds and on the markets, but two ele-
ments may be deplored.
First, even though both sets of reforms were discussed and
adopted simultaneously, they fall short of achieving a global conver-
gence of regulatory frameworks. The lack of coordination combined
427 The passport is not compulsory and the conditions for marketing in the Euro-
pean Union without a passport are set forth in Article 35i.
428 Unless they can demonstrate that it is impossible to combine compliance with
a provision of the Directive with compliance with a mandatory provision in the law
to which the non EU AIFM or the non EU AIF marketed in the European Union is
submitted, that the law to which they are submitted provides for an equivalent
rule having the same regulatory purpose and offering the same level of protection
to investors and that they are in compliance with this equivalent rule. AIFD, Art.
35d (2).
429 The Member state of reference is determined by several factors, as set forth in
Article 35d (4) and the conditions for managing AIF established in Member states
other than the Member state of reference by non EU AIFM are laid down in Article
35h.
430 AIFD, Art. 35d.
431 Id. Art. 35f.
432 Id. Art. 35g.
Non-EU AIFM may also market to non-EU
AIF under the passport. To be able to do
so, after 2015, AIFM will have to comply
with the provisions of the Directive, and
submit a notification to the competent au-
thorities of its Member state of reference.
Appropriate cooperation arrangements
should be in place between the competent
authorities of the Member state of refer-
ence and the supervisory authority of the
third country where the non-EU AIF is es-
tablished, the third country complies with
anti-money laundering regulations and the
Member state of reference and each other
member state in which the non-EU fund is
proposed to be marketed and the third
country should have signed an agreement
that complies with the OECD Model Tax
Convention 43 2
THE FUTURE OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION
with other increased requirements may prove an even larger challenge
for AIFM operating and marketing both in the United States and
throughout the EU.
Second, regulators missed the opportunity to coordinate their
efforts to create the global database of financial information for which
this paper advocates. Such coordination would gather data from all
major financial institutions on a confidential basis and assess inter-
connectedness in order to monitor systemic risk. Although the crea-
tion of the FSOC in the United States and the European Systemic Risk
Board in the EU demonstrates efforts in the right direction, systemic
risk needs to be appreciated on a global scale and a regional approach,
though encouraging, is unsatisfactory.
Finally, and in addition to the comments made above, this pa-
per advocates for the adoption of implementing measures only after
thorough cost/benefits analysis accounts for the impact of these mea-
sures on the hedge fund industry, on investors, and on the global fi-
nancial system. Regulators must consider each of these constituencies
since impeding hedge fund operations could have a tremendous and
detrimental effect on financial markets and the stability of the entire
financial system.
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